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Political parties and candidates need money for their activities. 
How to provide the necessary funds is a problem in most countries with 
a democratic system of freely competing political forces. Different 
approaches to a solution have been tried in the various countries, but 
no systematic study could be found which tried to evaluate the sugges-
tions and experiments in a comparative way. Emphasis in this study was 
put on the situation in Germany and the United States where the problem 
of political finance has been in the center of legislative and court 
action in 1966. Evaluations made in other countries, especially in 
France, Great Britain and Japan, have been included, wherever possible, 
in order to show the variety of theoretical and practical solutions.! 
The study was limited, however, by the availability of published 
material. 
In Chapter I, the regular sources of party funds will be exam-
ined. Most generally, parties and candidates have to rely upon private 
sources, especially membership dues and contributions. Increasing 
electorate and modernization of propaganda techniques, however, have 
enlarged the financial burden. Private funds have often become insuf-
ficient, despite the parties' reliance on sometimes dubious and even 
illegal sources. Instead of broadening their financial base by winning 
a large number of small contributors, most parties have followed the 
easier way of securing the help of a few wealthy contributors. 
1 
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Left to themselves, political parties often developed abuses and 
illegal practices in their financial activities. Many governments inter-
fered by imposing legal restrictions. This problem will be discussed in 
Chapter II. In most countries, legislative safeguards include provisions 
against corruption. Limitations of contributions to and expenditures by 
parties and candidates, as well as requirements for the disclosure of 
financial activities, are prescribed in only a small number of countries. 
In Chapter 111, public subsidies to political parties and candi-
dates will be evaluated. Most governments have taken over some political 
costs, mainly in connection with voter registration and poll administra-
' tion. Some have gone further and helped the parties and candidates 
defray part of their costs for specific kinds of propaganda. Only a few 
countries have gone so far as to give general financial aid to the 
parties and candidates, either in the form of tax benefits or of direct 
subsidization. This kind of government support is heavily disputed, 
especially in Germany and the United States. Some suggestions seek a 
solution to the problem by combining private and public sources of poli-
tical finance. 
CHAPTER I 
REGULAR PARTY FUNDS 
Sources 
Membership~ 
Membership dues are the soundest basis of party finance, at 
least in those countries where membership parties are traditional. The 
fact, however, is that no major party in the world is able to finance 
its activities from such dues. A study of eight countries in 1963 
revealed that only the Social Democratic party of Germany could be 
called a "membership" party, if this meant a party which covers at 
least two-thirds of its normal, non-election year expenses by membership 
dues. On the average, the major parties with a dues-paying system can 
do so only to about twenty percent.1 
In some countries, parties are not organized on a basis of dues-
paying members, as in France2 or the United States3 where only the 
Socialist parties try to finance at least part of their expenses by 
regular dues of members. A plan to establish memberships at the local 
level which would share funds with the state and national levels, as 
4 suggested by Paul T. David could hardly be realized in an environment 
of such a tradition. Sustaining fund memberships of $10 a year have 
only drawn 60,000 to 70,000 persons to each major party in the United 
5 States. This experiment was tried at the national level; an attempt 
at the local level with its closer relationship of party and followers 
3 
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might have a more favorable result. It must be remembered, however, 
that American politics center around the candidates and are not so much 
party-oriented. This might be a major obstacle in the way toward a 
large dues-paying membership for American parties. 
How difficult it is to change the tradition of a country with 
non-membership parties can be seen in Japan where, despite efforts to 
win dues-paying members, their number has remained very small.6 In the 
Philippines, with a generally very poor electorate, the situation is 
almost reversed. Not only do membership dues not exist, but the voters 
expect to receive money for their performance at the polls from the 
parties which are financed by business money. 7 At the other end of the 
scale is Israel where in 1961 nearly one-third of the eligible voters and 
more than forty percent of the actual voters of the eight major parties 
were party members. Probably not more than two-thirds of them pay their 
dues, which are rather high. They average one-half percent of the gross 
wage or salary and reach one full monthly salary per year in the Commun-
ist party, but are often not sufficient to cover the regular annual 
party budget. 8 
In Great Britain9 and Australia,10 parties--with the exception 
of the Australian Country party--derive only a small part of their income 
from membership dues. The British Conservative party gets an uneconomic 
27 cents a year from the great mass of its two to three million members, 
but an increase of this minimum amount might drive members away. The 
labor parties in both countries derive their main income from affiliation 
fees paid by the trade unions, not from individual members. The latter 
s 
situation is similar in all Mexican parties where membership is regarded 
as a by-product of joining one of the various functional groups, such as 
the National Peasants' Confederation or the Confederation of Mexican 
Workers. It is these groups which contribute to the income of the poli-
tical parties.ll 
German12 and Italian13 parties have a system of individual, not 
group, membership. About thirteen percent of the electorate in Italy 
are party members, but even this low number includes "ghost members." 
Dues do not cover more than twenty percent of the party expenditures. 
The difference in the size of membership among German parties has its 
effects on the income derived from this source. In 1963, the Social 
Democratic party (SPD) had an income of $3.5 million from its members, 
while the non-socialist parties derived a much smaller income from this 
source; the Christian Democrats (CDU), $0.75 million; its sister party, 
the Christian Socialists (CSU), $0.25 million; and the Free Democrats 
(FDP), $0.35 million.14 The SPD had a membership of some 750,000, the 
CDU/CSU of some 340,000 and the FOP of some so,ooo.15 The advantage of 
the Social Democrats is further increased by the fact that they have 
higher dues and are better disciplined than the other parties.16 The 
, 
SPD receives the bulk of its income from membership dues which are paid 
17 regularly to 94 percent. In 1959, over 80 percent of the dues came 
from members of the lowest income brackets, up to $75 monthly income.18 
Though the record of the Social Democrats in the field of membership 
dues may be comparatively high--Pollocttl.9 in the early l930's called the 
SPD in this respect "the most remarkable party in the world"--the fact 
6 
is that the proportion of members to voters was not more than 6.6 percent 
in 195720 and 10 percent in 1928.21 The comparative figures for the 
bourgeois parties in 1957 were considerably lower: 2.3 percent for the 
CDU, 2.8 percent for the FDP.22 There may be various reasons for the 
financial dependence of the Social Democrats on their membership, One 
of them probably is the--at least original--foundation of the party on 
class solidarity and the later efforts to keep the membership large.23 
In summary, therefore, membership dues are only a small part of 
the income needed by the major democratic parties all over the world. 
Dues are insufficient for financing election campaigns as well as for 
covering the regular party budget. As will be seen later,24 there 
remains only one way for the parties if they want to broaden their finan-
cial basis by winning a larger number of regular dues-paying members or 
of other small contributions: they will have to work harder and with 
more ingenuity. 
Large Contributions 
As their income from membership dues was too small, the parties 
had to look for other sources to finance their activities. In most 
countries, the easiest way to raise the necessary sums has been the 
appeal to a few rich individuals who can provide large amounts of money. 
The large contributions often have become the most important, but also the 
most controversial, source of party income. This source is so important 
because the parties generally have not succeeded in finding a working 
system of attracting a large number of small contributors; and it is 
controversial because it is regarded as favoring the few big givers and, 
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therefore, as undemocratic. 25 In countries with a party system divided 
between socialist and bourgeois parties, usually only the latter rely 
heavily on large contributions, but they often try to conceal the fact 
and sometimes attempt to broaden their subscription lists. 
The problem of large.contributions has been of special concern 
in the United States. Alexander Heard26 in 1960 found that at the 
national level most money came from individuals contributing $500 or 
more; at lower levels the number of such gifts was much smaller compared 
to gifts between·$100 and $499. Heard27 concluded that "Certainly the 
bulk of political money is supplied by a relatively small number of 
people." This observation is confirmed by the data collected in Florida 
after ten years of experience with a new law28 which, in 1951, intro-
duced stricter provisions for the disclosure of campaign contributions 
and expenditures. Most of the money came from the above $250 category; 
the number of contributions of $1,000 rose from 29 in 1952 to 360 in 
1960; the number of contributions of $50 or less declined from 14,380 in 
29 1952 to 10,718 in 1960. 
Evidence of this kind leads observers to the summary statement 
that large contributions still are the largest single source of party 
income. While such a conclusion is probably true for the situation in 
most countries and for most political parties, important exceptions can 
be observed. Herbert Alexander30 gives a tabulation of the proportion 
of individual contributions of $500 or more made to the Democratic and 
Republican parties at the national level between 1948 and 1964: 
8 
National Level 
Comittees (year) 1948 1952 1956 1960 1964 
Democratic (%) 69 63 44 59 69 
Republican (%) 74 68 74 58 28 
Most interesting is the trend for the Republican party. Up to 1956, 
this party relied on large contributions to nearly three-quarters of its 
income from individual contributions at the national level. The propor-
tion sank to less than two-thirds and finally to less than one-third in 
the two most recent presidential election years of 1960 and 1964. 
It can be concluded that large contributions by a relatively 
small number of contributors are the major source of party income, but 
that serious and successful attempts can be observed which are designed 
to reduce the proportion and influence of large contributions in favor of 
smaller sums. 
Business and Labor ---
Business and labor have proved to be the best sources for large 
contributions to political parties, despite legal restrictions in some 
countries.31 In Japan, relatively few companies and economic associa~ 
32 tions make all the large contributions. The conservative parties have 
intimate connections with the business community and collect their cam-
paign funds from corporate sources.33 At least 90 percent of the income 
of the Liberal Democratic party is provided by businessmen. This does 
not quite lead to business domination, but to business dependence of the 
34 party. Contributions from financial, industrial, commercial, and other 
economic institutions cover part of the income of the parties in lsraei. 35 
9 
In the Philippines, despite legal prohibition, domestic and foreign 
business remain the major source of party funds. 36 Large business con-
tributions to political parties are not unknown in French87 and British38 
politics. 
The non-socialist parties in Germany were already heavily depend-
ent on business money in the Weimar Republic. 39 Hitler's party with the 
"big guns of German industrial interests behind040 was able to spend 
$0.75 pe·r vote, the Social Democrats only $0.13. After the War, the 
bourgeois parties with their small dues-paying membership continued to 
rely on the traditional source of business money from the beginning of 
the Federal Republic. This, to a large degree, was true at least until 
the late 19SO's, when a tax decision by the Constitutional Court made 
business contributions to political parties more expensive.41 Before 
the Court's decision, funds of the CDU and FDP were covered up to 80 and 
42 90 percent by business money. 
Business in Germany has developed a special form of political 
contributing. The money is given to the parties not by the corporations 
themselves, but mainly by associations which are formed by the corpora-
tions. In the Weimar Republic, the associations collected the money 
after the candidates for the party lists had been nominated by the par-
43 , ties. Since the War, business money has been channeled mainly through 
the Sponsors' Associations (Foerderer-Gesellschaften) at the state level 
and the Civic Association (Staatsbuergerliche Vereinigung) at the federal 
level. Fonnally trade associations, the Sponsors' Associations collected 
the money from their members by determining the different amounts on the 
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basis of payroll figures or sales turnover. About half of all employers 
and two-thirds of all large corporations contributed. The success of 
the system was partly due to the fact that the payments to the associa-
44 tions meant protection from further solicitation by the parties. Simi-
lar practices of organized business contributions to political parties 
have been undertaken by the Union of Economic Interests and other groups 
45 46 in France, by various trade and economic associations in Japan, and 
by organizations in Great Britain which have recently been developed for 
the purpose of collecting political contributions from industry.47 The 
funds contributed to political parties by the different functional 
organizations in Mexico can also be included in this category.48 
In the United States, the restriction on contributions from 
business and labor has been a legal problem for more than half a century,49 
but parties still receive large amounts of money from these sources. 
Observations made under the new law in Florida show that the greatest 
amounts of money came from commercial and financial centers of the 
state. 50 
51 Though Bernstein's statement that in West Europe political 
parties of the right are tied to business and political parties of the 
left are tied to labor is simplified, as Bernstein52 himself admits, the 
statement can be applied, with reservations, to most democratic countries 
in the world. One of the reservations is the practice of business firms 
which contribute to opposing parties. This can be observed in many 
countries such as the United States, Canada, Philippines, Japan, Denmark, 
and Uruguay. 53 This "two-party giving"--or, in countries with more than 
ll 
two major parties, "multi-party giving''--has been condemned by Pollock54 
because the money is given in order to obtain favors from the winning 
side. Heard's55 observation that two-party giving is trnothing but insur-
ance" to many businessmen is no argument against Pollock's rejection. 
But Heard56 also found that two-party giving can be based on a belief in 
the two-party system and can be compared to split-ticket voting when it 
is restricted to parties and not extended to opposing candidates. As far 
as the motives of the contributor are concerned, two-party giving can be 
as good or as bad as any other political contribution. As to the effect 
on the party system, it may be even less harmful because it helps to 
balance party strength or at least prevents preponderance of one side. 
The dependence of the conservative parties on business has been 
demonstrated. Honey from labor unions provides a large part of the 
socialist parties with the bulk of their income. In Australia, the Labor 
party covers 80 to 90 percent of its regular budget by the affiliated 
fees paid by the trade unions to the party's state branches. 57 In Great 
Britain, the unions which contribute 40 percent of the total Labor party 
income are the main financial backers of the party.58 In 1954, the 
unions had 7.7 million members. Only 5.5 million of them were affili-
ated, through the unions, with the Labor party, but 6.8 million paid the 
political levy which goes into the party funds. 59 
Legislation restricts labor contributions to political parties 
in the United States. 6° COPE, the AFL-CIO Committee on Political 
Education, has a fund consisting mainly of $1 voluntary contributions by 
union members. In 1956, COPE collected over $1 million. About half of 
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this money was spent by COPE, the rest by state unions for political 
activities involving parties, conunittees and candidates.61 In 1964, 
COPE spent about $1 million. 62 The unions try to influence the political 
63 process in various other ways which are left open by legal regulations. 
In summary, Alexander Heard's observation on business money in 
politics can be extended to labor money; that business and labor "with 
interests directly affected by governmental action are highly sensitive 
politically."64 Both share the most important role in financing the 
activities of political parties. 
Other Sources 
The high costs of their activities have forced the parties to 
look for new sources of money wherever they could find them. Rarely any 
potential source is neglected, and sometimes even illegal money finds 
its way into party funds. 
Candidates who try to be elected to a public office by using a 
party's name and reputation are generally expected to pay their own way, 
in part or in full, and possibly to contribute to the general party 
funds. The amount depends on the importance of the office for which the 
candidate is running, on his own resources, and his desirability to the 
party, on the party's financial situation, and the degree of competition 
for the office. In Weimar Germany, the parties often selected wealthy 
candidates who were able to finance at least part of their own campaign;65 
today, candidates must share the campaign expenees. 66 About one-fourth 
of the candidates in France paid their campaigns and wealthy candidates 
spent large s\.Ulls.67 
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In various countries, party members in the parliament have to 
contribute a certain amount of their salary to their party's funds. In 
Australia, this money is a considerable potential source at the federal 
and state levels. 68 Diet members of the Japanese Liberal Democratic 
party probably provide 50 percent of their party's membership dues. 69 
The practice was common in Weimar Germany where Social Democratic members 
of the Reichstag were assessed 20 percent of their allowances by their 
party, while the Communists had to pay as much as 40 percent.70 The 
Social Democrats have continued this tradition after the War and demand 
20 percent of the salary of their deputies in the Bundestag, as do the 
other partiea.71 Between 1949 and 1959, levies paid by SPD party members 
in the various German parliaments provided from 5 to 14 percent of the 
total income of tbe party executive. 72 
Assessment of public employees by political parties is practiced, 
especially in countries where the parties influence heavily the filling 
of government positions. In the United States, since the 1830's73 the 
"spoils system" has enabled the systematic assessment of government 
officials at all levels. Contributions have generally ranged from 1 to 
5 percent of the ealary,74 although figures up to 12 percent are also 
75 mentioned. Restrictive legislation and the extension of the merit sys-
tem have reduced the importance of this source of party income. 76 At 
the national level, the practice has almost disappeared, but at the state 
and local levels it still plays a role in all parts of the United 
States.77 Heard78 estimated the party income derived from office-holders 
at $5 million to $15 million in a presidential election year. In Puerto 
14 
Rico, before the introduction of the Election Fund Act of 195779 which 
provides for public subsidies of the political parties, dues or "quotastt 
collected from government employees, who were assessed a small percentage 
of their salaries, amounted to a considerable part of the governing Popu-
lar Democratic party's income. It is interesting to note that the 
party's leader, Luis Munoz Marin, defended this practice as being less 
dangerous than a reliance on large contributions by a few wealthy 
givers. 80 
Contributions to political parties are not only made in cash. 
Other methods of giving are the provision of services and assistance to 
the parties. These include such means as giving, free of charge, space 
for party propaganda in newspapers, cars for transportation of voters on 
election day, or office staff for secretarial work. A practice developed 
by the socialist parties in many countries, e.g. in Germany, Great 
Britain, or the United States, has been the activation of volunteer 
workers for campaign and other party work. While in Germany volunteers 
have become more and more rare,81 Heard82 reports that in the United 
States volunteer labor is still mobilized at a large rate, without 
restricting his statement to any particular party. A frequent means 
used by the parties to keep the helpers at work is patronage, which 
enables the party to distribute public offices for loyal party services. 
Another source of revenue for various parties is their involve-
ment in commercial activities. In Germany, parties derive part of their 
income from publishing companies which they own, or they have investments 
in other business enterprises. This is especially true for the Social 
15 
Democratic party.83 Individuals in Italy make indirect contributions to 
political parties by patronizing party activities or party-owned busi-
ness firms. 84 
One of the most successful methods of raising money for political 
parties is the organization of the various dinners, parties, picnics, and 
other entertainments by party committees at all levels. This practice 
has been developed to a high degree of perfection in the United States 
since the War, though it had already been known in the 19th century.85 
The advantage of the method is its adaptability and flexibility as to 
time, place, and attending persons. Ticket prices can be fixed at a 
rate between $1 or $10 to $1,000 or more. Invitations can be sent and an 
environment of social pressure can be created which makes it difficult 
for a prospective "guest" to refuse the "invitation."86 Often the sale 
of tickets for such an event is indistinguishable from political assess-
ment.87 Uncertainty about legal requirements as to the reporting of the 
names of the persons who purchase tickets has generally helped solicita-
tion. 88 The "Tax Adjustment Act of 1966";"89 however, has put some 
limitation on this kind of activity by prohibiting tax deductions for· 
ticket purchases. Income from the dinners has been considerable. By the 
1950's, political parties at the state level covered probably one-third 
of their total income from political dinners.90 The $500-a-plate dinner 
which the Republican Senatorial committee gave in 1965 for 800 guests in 
honor of Senator Dirksen may serve as an example. The net income was 
$380,000, a sum large enough to cover the committee's activities for the 
year.91 
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Another practice, also very lucrative but also hampered by the 
"Tax Adjustment Act of 1966," has been the sale of advertising space in 
party publications at disproportionate rates. The cost per ad in the 
1965 book of the Democratic party, Toward !!l Age 2f Greatness, was about 
twelve times higher than in a national magazine like Time when the circu-
lation is taken into account.92 The net income from the book for the 
party was more than $600,000.98 The Republican party had netted about 
$250,000'from their magazine, Congress--The Heartbeat of Government, in 
the previous year. 94 Similar practices have been observed in Germany 
where indirect contributions have been made by subscribing for party 
periodicals at a disproportionate rate and number of copies.95 
The importance of money which flows into party funds from the 
illegal sources of the "underworld," i.e. from law breakers in general 
and from organized crime in particular, is most difficult to estimate. 
Louise Overacker96 in the early 1930's thought the amount was "consider-
able," especially in big cities and for local campaign funds. Heard,97 
in 1960, reported connections of politics and crime at the ward and pre-
cinct level. His guess was that contributions to party funds--not to be 
mixed up with graft and bribery of public officials--covered 15 percent 
of party expenditures at the state and local levels. The limited scope 
of "underworld" activities make these contributors generally seek only 
protection without an attempt at wider party dominance. A somewhat more 
dangerous situation was described by Levin,98 in 1962, from evidence in 
Massachusetts, where candidates, especially when running for nomination, 
often needed the money from corrupt sources. Later, it was almost 
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impossible for them to change over to more respectable sources. Another 
corrupt source of political money is created in some countries by the 
habit of giving away government contracts under the asswnption that the 
contractor will make a financial contribution to the party. Though it 
is often illegal for a govemment contractor to make any political con-
tributions, regardless of a quid pro guo situation, the practice is 
still existent.99 
Conclusion 
Political parties derive their income from various sources. In 
this first part only private money has been considered; public help will 
be treated below.100 Each source is of different importance for the 
various political parties. Without regard to details, it can be con-
cluded that no major party is able to finance its activities from member-
ship dues. Host parties are dependent on large contributions which 
mainly come from business or labor. All other private sources are 
relatively insignificant, perhaps with the exception of political dinners 
in the United States; but the effect of the 1966 tax legislation on this 
latter source must be awaited.' On the whole, private financing of 
political parties is in an unsatisfactory state. 
Expenditures 
High Political Costs 
The parties' need for large amounts of money becomes evident from 
a look at their expenditures. Extension of suffrage and the introduction 
of modem technical facilities for propaganda are the main factors which 
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are responsible for the increase in political costs. Whether the costs 
have gone up only in their absolute amounts or also when considered in 
relation to the larger number of voters and the increasing level of 
living expenses is difficult to say as not all estimates differentiate 
between these two ways of computation. Often no comparisons with earlier 
years are made at all. 
There exist wide differences in the amounts which have to be 
spent by·the political parties in the various countries in order to get 
their candidates elected. In the Philippines, election expenditures made 
up 13 percent of the. national budget in 1961. Total expenditures in-
101 creased about 16 times from 1946 to 1961. In Germany; the annual 
amount needed by the major parties (CDU/CSU, SPD, and FDP) was estimated 
in 1965 at about $17.5 million,or at about $21 million if the costs of 
campaigning for the Bundestag elections were included.102 Election 
expenditures and costs per successful votes in Israel rise by geometrical 
ma progression. In 1961, the expenditures of all parties for the Knesset 
elections were $6.75 per eligible voter and over $8 per actual voter; the 
cost per floating vote was estimated at $83.104 Per capita costs per 
elective office, given by Heard,105 amount to 15 cents in the United 
States (1952}, 16 cents in Great Britain, 25 cents in Germany (1957}, 
50 cents in Italy (1958}, and $5 in Israel (1955). Heidenheimer106 de-
signed an "Index of Expenditures" to measure the expenses which are 
necessary to cause a person to cast his vote. By relating total expendi-
tures, number of votes cast, and the average hourly wage of industrial 
workers to each other, Heidenheimer made up the following table: 
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Index .2.f Expenditures 
Australia {1958) .45 
Great Britain {1959) .64 
Germany (1961) .95 
United States (1960) 1.12 
India {1961) 1.25 
Italy (1958-1960) 4.5 
Philippines {1961) 16. 
Israel (1960) 20.5 
General statements on election costs in the United States point 
out their continuous increase. More detailed surveys show that this is 
only partly true. Expenditures like the $1.5 million spent for the cam-
paign of Democratic Governor Shapp of Pennsylvania or the $4.3 million 
spent for the election of Republican Governor Rockefeller of New York in 
107 1966 a~e no exceptions; but more complete evaluations than such 
single incidents reveal a truer picture. The cost per vote cast in 
presidential elections has remained surprisingly constant for almost 
fifty years. It amounted to aqout 20 cents between 1912 and 1928, though 
the increase of living costs of about 40 percent during this period has 
not been taken into consideration.108 The same amount was spent in the 
109 110 presidential election years 1952 and 1956. According to Heard, 
campaign costs did not increase faster than living costs between 1940 and 
1956. In the last decade, however, the costs per presidential vote have 
gone up sharply to S2 cents in 1960 and to 41 cents in 1964.111 Though 
the relative increase of political costs may not have been quite so large 
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as is generally thought, the last two presidential elections have 
changed the picture somewhat, and the absolute amounts spent have been 
considerable at all times. Total expenditures in the United States on 
all political levels--federal, state and local--were estimated for 1952 
at $140 million, for 1956 at $155 million, for 1960 at $175 million, and 
for 1964 at $200 million.112 These are only the amounts spent for cam-
paigns in presidential election years. No estimate was made as to the 
needs of·the political parties in the years between these elections. 
Ways !!f Spending 
The size of the budget which the parties have at their disposal 
may vary to a large degree, but all parties have one goal in common; to 
win the highest possible number of voters for their ticket. Technical 
facilities and voter habits open and at the same time limit the potential 
113 means of propaganda. Heard found that parties, though they may have 
budgets of quite different sizes, spend their money in a very similar 
way. The factors which determine party expenditures vary from country to 
country and from campaign to campaign. Differences arise from the struc-
ture of the parties and the political system under which they operate. 
For the_ United States, surveys in the late 1920 1s and early 1930 1s 
estimated that the parties spent between 85 and 55 percent of their funds 
on publicity, and between 15 and 40 percent on general administration.114 
After the War, costs for the mass communication media have taken the 
first place in campaign budgets in countries where radio and television 
time is for sale. Reports made under the new Florida law show that in 
1956 parties spent most money on television, printing, newspaper 
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advertising, radio, and paid workers, in this order.ll5 In the same 
year, parties in the United States as a whole spent 40 percent of their 
funds at the national level and 25 percent at the state level on tele-
vision and radio propaganda.116 Station charges for political broad-
casting totaled $20 million in 1962, a year without presidential elec-
tiona.117 Costs increased by almost 50 percent between 1956 and 1960.118 
In Australia, parties, according to estimates, in 1963 spent 30 to 35 
percent of their funds for radio and television time, 25 to S5 percent 
for newspaper advertising, and 20 to 30 percent for printing.ll9 News-
paper expenditures in Israel increased over 50 percent from 1959 to 
120 · 1961. Between 10 and 20 percent of all campaign expenditures were 
mad~ on election day itself, mainly for hiring transportation for voters 
and for buying food for volunteer helpers.121 In the Philippines, it is 
customary for candidates to buy gifts for voters and even bribe them, 
though both are illegal; but the law is not enforced.122 Election day 
expenses are also high in the United States where Heard128 estimated 
them at about 12 percent of total party expenditures and at 20 to 50 
percent of ~ocal committee expe_nditures. It is also interesting to note 
how a highly organized party, such as the Social Democrats in Germany, 
spends its funds: two-thirds go into election propaganda and the rest 
into administration costs.124 
Inefficiencies 
High expenditures often result from the fact that it is not known 
which means of propaganda are most effective. Campaign managers do not 
want to take any risk and spend as much as they can.125 More than thirty 
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years ago, authors pointed out that much waste was involved in most 
political campaigns, amounting to 25 and SO percent of the total expen-
ditures.126 There has been no change over the decades. According to 
Heard,127 most political organizations in the United States are still 
inefficient and wasteful. The President's Commiesion128 recommended 
research for increasing campaign efficiency snd 1-educing campaign waste, 
as probably half of the campaign expenditures were wasted. Due to the 
inefficiency of their officials, many party committees hire news and 
advertising agencies to do campaign business for them. This practice 
may have a dangerous effect on party responsibility in cases where the 
larger part of the responsibility for a whole campaign is given to such 
an agency, as has already happened.129 
Conclusion 
Election costs are high in all countries, and where parties main-
tain a permanent organization and activities in the time between elec-
tions they have to raise another large amount of money. The parties 
spend their money in different ways according to the situation in the 
campaign and the particular country. Their common goal, to attract 
voters, makes them use similar devices depending on tradition and techni-
cal progress. As no certainty exists about the efficiency of the various 
means of propaganda, all ways are exploited, and a waste of money is the 
result. 
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Broadening .1:!!!, Financial!!!!!., 
Party Efforts 
The essential need for a broader financial base of party support 
has been recognized over and over again, in the last years by Presidents 
Kennedy180 and Johnson,131 and sch~lars in the field of political finance 
J 
such as Herbert Alexander132 and--not so decidedly--Alexander H~ard.lSS 
Realizing the danger of depending on large contributions, the parties 
have looked for other sources of income. Attempts have been made to 
solicit large sums of money from a larger n,Jmber of small contributors. 
Tradition, lack of ingenuity, skill or energy, and easier access to other 
sources have proved to be major obstacles in the way of broadening the 
financial base of the political parties. 
In Britain, attempts in this direction have not been too 
successful, because party efforts are weak Bnd society does not consider 
political contributions as part of their responsibility.134 Tradition 
in Japan regards fund-giving as a matter of group activity, not as an 
individual's obligation. Attempts to increase the number of small con-
tributions have been little suc~essful.135 In addition, the law prohibits 
door-to-door soliciting.136 In Germany, the blame is put on the "Anti-
Parteien-Affekt," a sentiment against political parties allegedly exist-
ing in the population because of anti-democratic thinking in the Weimar 
Republic and bad experience with Hitler's party.137 · 
American parties have tried to enlarge the number of their finan-
cial supports for more than fifty yea~s, with little success, however. 
In 1916, the Republicans sold sustaining memberships of $10 per year; the 
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number of contributions increased. The Democrats developed the Jamieson 
plan under which 600,000 letters were sent out; these brought S00,000 
contributions between 1916 and 1920. In 1920 and 1924, the Republicans 
launched personal solicitation drives for small contributions, similar 
to those of the Red Cross; the 1920 experiment was limited to contribu-
tions up to $1,000. With the exception of the Republican plan in 1924 
which had a measurable success, the experiments were too expensive to be 
called successful.138 The best latown attempt after the War to raise 
small contributions was the Ruml plan139 in 1952. It was not successful, 
but not so much due to its general design as to the particular circum-
stances. Ruml, appointed finance chainnan of the Democratic national 
committee, tried to stimulate $5 contributions by handing out certifi-
cates with the help of the party's organizations in the states. The 
failure of the plan was mainly due to the lack of a working hierarchy in 
the party organization, by the reluctance of party officials in the 
states to take part because they feared a decrease of their own income 
from contributions, the late start of the plan, the fact that it was 
part of a losing campaign, and ~he inexperience of Ruml and his staff.140 
The attempt, however, showed that there was a need for such a campaign 
because it revealed that many people simply had not latown how to give to 
a political party and that the parties were interested in such small 
contributions.141 The result of these and similar efforts has led to the 
opinion that the solicitation of small contributions is too difficult and 
costly in administration and therefore inadequate to help the parties' 
financial problems or even to become an alternative to the large 
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contributions. The question is, however, whether the experiments have 
been tried seriously enough and during a sufficiently long period of 
time to be conclusive. The Ruml plan revealed two major insufficiencies 
in the approach: defects in the party organization for this kind of 
solicitation and unfamiliarity of the population with political giving. 
It could well be that costs of administration are high only in the 
beginning as long as the population is not acquainted with contributions 
to political parties. Attempts must be made to escape the vicious circle: 
solicitations for small contributions are not made because of the high 
costs, and people do not make small contributions because they are not 
asked. Heard142 observed that contributors are often more interested 
also in other aspects of politics when compared with non-givers. 
Pollock,143 already in the early 19301s, pointed out that the dues-paying 
members of the SPD in Germany, from their financial involvement, developed 
a closer attention to their party 'g, a-ffiirs in general. Financial support 
and interest in politics are closely interrelated and affect each other. 
It is the parties' task to initiate this chain reaction. Even if such 
an attempt were not successful financially, the resulting activation of 
supporters would seem to be a rewarding effect in itself. 
Some party efforts to collect small sums have had a better re-
sponse. Between 1952 and 1956, the number of persons making political 
contributions rose from 3 to 8 million or from 4 to 10 percent. Thia 
increase in political giving was larger than that of other political 
activities.144 The women's division of the Republican party tried a 
successful house-to-house canvass in the mid-l9SO's to raise dollar 
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contributions.145 If the drive is conducted seriously, satisfactory 
results can be achieved. Hennepin County in Minnesota raised $40,000 
in 1958 and $94,000 in 1960, though the goal for this year had been set 
at only $60,000 by the Minnesota Republican finance conunittee; the state-
wide goal was also exceeded in 1960.146 In 1964, $364,000 was collected 
from more than 60,000 givers.147 The Democratic National Committee 
sells memberships for $10 a year; between 1957 and 1960 about $1 million 
was raised, $400,000 in 1960 alone. Renewal rates reached up to 80 
percent.148 The same practice was started by the Republicans in 1962; 
income was $70,000 in the first year, $1.1 million in 1963, and $1 
million in the first half of 1964,149 Appeals were made by mail using 
mailing lists which were partly bought or rented from business firms.150 
Mass solicitation, accompanied for the first time by direct mail and 
television appeals on a large scale, was made by the Republican party in 
1960; 650,000 persons contributed, 560,000 of them less than $100. A 
broadcasting appeal by two movie actors helped to collect $2 million in 
five days.151• In 1964, a direct mail appeal of 15 million letters 
brought 380,000 replies; contri~utions amounted to $5.8 million, costs 
l~ . to $1 million. The following year, 3 million mail appeals resulted 
in contributions of $1.7 million.153 According to Billy Higgins, direc-
tor of the Republican mail campaign, an advertising agency was given the 
responsibility of obtaining and preparing the mailing lists; lS percent 
of the letters were successful but even one percent would pay the costs 
and be considered worthwhile.154 In 1964, 32.4 percent of the Republican 
national and.campaign income came from direct mail appeals; this was at 
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the same time the highest single kind of contributions.155 
It must be noted, however, that these data do not only represent 
contributions in small amounts; $100 is a large sum for most people. 
Furthermore, these appeals were mostly undertaken at the national level, 
and it is not sure how they would work at lower levels. Recent experi-
ments show that efforts by the parties, such as ·in Hennepin Countyl-56 or 
in Alexandria,157 or the direct mail appeals can have satisfactory 
results as far as response from the population is concerned and from a 
financial point of view. Large amounts in small sums can be raised 
effectively and economically. The basis for successful results, however, 
is seriousness, perseverance, and ingenuity on the parties' side. 
Supra-Party Efforts 
Efforts to develop and execute plans to activate citizens for 
political contributing have also been made on non-partisan and multi-
partisan bases. The American Heritage Foundation had undertaken non-
partisan registration-and-vote campaigns in:'the 19SO's, before it 
included an appeal for political contributions in 1958. A public opinion 
survey revealed that more than 40 percent of the American adults had 
become aware of this new aspect of the campaign.158 American business 
firms and labor unions whose participation in political financing is 
restricted by law make use of the device of non- and all-partisan drives 
to increase political activity among their workers, followers, and also 
outsiders. The drives are undertaken by single or combined efforts of 
corporations, unions, and civil groups. In mid-1963, American business 
founded the Business-Industry Political Action Committee (BIPAC) to 
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represent its viewpoint and support candidates.159 Labor bas had its 
Committee on Political Education {COPE) since 1955.160 Similar efforts 
have been observed in other countries.161 The legal difficulties in 
the way of such activities will be discussed later.162 
Non- or all-partisan drives for registration, voting, and poli-
tical contributing are often not so impartial as would be desirable. 
The appeal might well be favorable to one party only, if a group is 
activated which--from its background--will support a particular party. 
If the money is collected for one common fund, difficulties of allocating 
the shares among the parties arise. If the money is not given to the 
parties, administration problems come up. 
'The appearance of interested groups which try to influence the 
political course by financial contributions in the disguise of so-called 
"non-partisan" organizations is not new. In the United States of the 
1920's it was such groups as the Anti-Saloon teague.168 Despite their 
limitation to the advocacy of a general policy since 1918, so-called 
non-partisan agencies have influenced British elections by money.164 In 
Germany, "neutral" groups make propaganda for political parties by 
"pai·allel activities" (Parallelaktionen) •165 They play an important 
role and are effe~tive because they pretend to be independent, but 
actually they support a particular party.166 Volunteer limitations of 
party propaganda are thus made difficult because there is no efficient 
way to include the parallel activities in the agreement.167 
Various plans to increase the number of small contributions by 
non- and all-partisan efforts have been suggested. They try to make use 
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of situations in which the general public might easily be stimulated to 
contribute to a political fund. Parties could establish propaganda 
booths at fairs or other points where masses of people meet who have 
plenty of leisure time, and sell sustaining memberships and souvenirs.168 
The interest of many people in taking part in competitions could be used 
to introduce an "Informed Citizen" contest. Newspapers would publish 
the questions and people could take part with a small entrance fee. 
Half of the revenue could be used for prizes, the rest given to the 
parties. An entry fee of 50 cents would bring a yearly contribution of 
about $60 million for the parties, if the contests were given weekly and 
about six million people took part each time.169 Other forms of contests 
could include competitions between the parties, showing which gets the 
largest amount of small contributions between $1 and $10 in a limited 
period before election day;170 or a popular sport like bowling could be 
used to set up citizens' teams which pay a small entry fee and compete 
against teams of politicians.171 Kilpatrick172 designed a plan which is 
intended to overcome the difficulties of mass solicitation by mail or 
personal canvassing. The idea is to avoid the psychological problem of 
mail' appeals--where stimulus and action of giving are separated--and to 
diminish the high,administration costs of personal solicitation. Super-
markets, banks, post offices, and other places frequented by many people 
would be used for a fund-raising drive over a short period before elec-
tion day. Kilpatrick estimated the income at about $40 million in one 
campaign of ten weeks, if only the three largest American food store 
chains participated and every shopper contributed five cents a week. 
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Though these plans may seem to hold little promise at the first 
glance, they might contain a solution to the problem of involving large 
nwnbers of people in political giving and of keeping the costs of admin-
istration low. The President's Conunission178 recommended Kilpatrick's 
plan for further consideration. Another kind of suggestion is to give 
the independent voter a chance to contribute to a fund which is used to 
present impartial political information.174 Arrangements could be made 
similar to those found in Japan, where non-partisan COUiJDittees sponsor 
public discussions among opposing candidates.175 
A successful all-partisan fund drive was undertaken by a door-to-
door canvass in Alexandria, Minnesota, in 1956. A steering committee, 
consisting of one Republican, one Democrat, and one independent citizen, 
was set up and 65 solicitors sent out in pairs of different political 
denomination. The solicitors went out for several nights after the 
drive had been publicized in the press. On the average, 76 percent of 
the people contacted contributed from 8 cents to $100, generally about 
$1. Out of 1,000 people contacted, only 20 wished to give to a particu-
lar party; the rest gave to the,common party fund which was divided 
among the parties according to the votes received in the previous 
176 , election. An editorial in the Kansas~~ estimated that, on a 
nationwide basis, the experirr~nt would have brought some $62 million.177 
Conclusion 
Soliciting small amounts of money from large numbers of people 
can, therefore, be a successful way of broadening the financial base of 
political parties. The attempt can be made either by the parties 
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themselves or by other groups with a non- or all-partisan appeal. In 
the latter case, however, some kind of device seems to be necessary 
which would guarantee the impartial administration of the funds collected. 
Both ways, the partisan and the all- or non-partisan, should be tried in 
order to give party members as well as independent citizens an opportun-
ity to contribute financially to a politicel cause. What is necessary, 
above all, is to make people acquainted with the idea that political 
contributions are part of the democratic system of government. 
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Kinds 2f Legislation 
The costs of politics require the investment of financial means. 
The observation that the amount of money spent and the way it is spent 
are able to influence the outcome of a campaign, at least in some cases, 
has led to the opinion that some legal regulation is necessary to protect 
the egalitarian principle of government. 
The first legislation was directed against the corrupt use of 
money. It has been enacted since ancient times and can be found in most 
t ,. l coun r~es. 
Later restrictions were imposed on certain kinds of political 
financing in general. This second kind of legislation, which is negative 
in character, has been prevalent in the Anglo-American system since the 
last part of the nineteenth century. Its underlying philosophy is that 
unregulated and undisclosed financing of political campaigns will lead 
to the corrupt use of money in elections and that, on the other hand, 
prohibition of certain sources, limitation of contributions and expendi-
tures, and public disclosure will prevent the improper use of money in 
elections.2 Therefore, present laws, especially in the United States, 
have four basic forms: they prohibit contributions from certain sources, 
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such as from business and labor, and impose ceilings on others, such as 
from individuals; they limit expenditures by parties and candidates, 
both as to type and amount; they protect public employees from solicit-
ing; and they demand public disclosure of political funds. 3 Similar laws 
partially exist in other countries, such as Japan,4 the Philippines,5 and 
France, 6 etc. 7 
A third way of regulating political financing is the positive 
approach.by which parties and candidates are encouraged and supported in 
their financial efforts. Legislation is sporadic and ranges from minor 
indirect subsidies, such as giving public halls for political rallies 
or granting tax benefits for political contributions, to open financial 
support in large amounts out of the public treasury. Details on this 
latter kind of legislation will be given in Chapter III; here, in Chap-
ter II, the restrictive type of regulations will be examined. 
Influence~ Honey .2!!. Politics 
The usefulness of negative legal regulations, except for the 
laws against corruption, is heavily disputed. Two major points of con-
troversy are the questions of whether money wins elections and whether 
contributors control the receivers of their money. 
Despite a widely held popular belief that money determines the 
outcome of elections, studies show that no simple relationship exists 
between campaign expenditures and election results. Presidential elec-
tions in the United States between 1904 and 1928 were won by the party 
which spent the larger amount of money: from 51 to 75 percent of the 
combined direct expenditures made by the Republican and Democratic National 
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Committees. Between 1932 and 1948 the winning party spent less than the 
loser, from 49 to 35 percent.8 In Israel, it often happens that parties 
lose support despite an increase in their financial investments.9 
Income and membership of the Socialist Party in Italy reach only one-
third those of the Communists, but its voters amount to two-thirds.10 
After the introduction of the new disclosure law in Florida, those candi-
dates who reported highest expenditures have generally won, but this 
correlation has not been true for the candidates in the positions behind 
the winner.11 
Money, therefore, is only one factor which determines the outcome 
of a political campaign. Other factors, such as party loyalty, ethnic 
and religious background of the voters, the character of the issues, or 
the personality of the candidates, play also an important role. The 
impact of money on a campaign is difficult to estimate because none of 
the several influencing factors can be isolated. The only safe statement 
probably is that the importance of money increases as the other factors 
become more balanced, the race closer, and the office less conspicuous. 
How far contributors try to influence the policy of those to whom 
they give is even more difficult to estimate. It probably depends to a 
high degree on the political culture of the particular country. Pollock12 
reported little or no suspicion in Britain that campaign contributions 
would influence policy, because public men were averse to it, the offices 
of fund collectors and party leaders were separated, and no governmental 
favors could be expected. On the other hand, Senator Neuberger13 from 
Oregon complained in 1956 that he had been offered substantial 
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contributions to his campaign with definite ties. Levin14 observed in 
Massachusetts that the amount of contributions tended to change accord-
ing to the candidates' chances of winning and usually came in at the end 
of the campaign when the race was almost decided. Another factor deter-
mining the answer of this second question is the motivation of the 
particular contributor. Nobody gives away money without purpose and 
some expectations, but political contributions are not necessarily based 
on corrupt and illegal hopes. Interviews in North carolina in 1952 
revealed that political contributors are motivated by a genuine concern 
for a public policy as well as by the desire to gain some kind of special 
privilege.15 
As the abuse of money in politics is possible, it can be con-
cluded that some legal restrictions are necessary in this field. Tempt-
ation is too great and stakes are too important to leave the matter 
without control. 
Corruption 
Attempts to influence the outcome of elections by corruption, 
especially bribery, are as old ·as popular voting itself •16 The practice 
existed in ancient Greece and Rome, in the Middle Ages, and in modern 
times, in our culture as well as in others, such as the Japanese. Legal 
measures were introduced for prevention. In Rome, laws can be traced 
back to 432 B.C. In England, corrupt practices were offenses at common 
law. The first law against bribery and treating was passed in 1695, but 
effective legislation did not exist before the middle of the nineteenth 
century.17 In 1883, the first comprehensive law, the Corrupt and Illegal 
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Practices Prevention Act,18 was passed by the British parliament. It 
became the model for similar legislation in Japan, Canada, Australia, 
and the United States. The first federal statute relating to corruption 
in elections was adopted in the United States in 1870,19 but was repealed 
to a large extent in 1894.20 
Provisions against bribery in elections, at present, exist in 
constitutions, criminal or election codes of many countries, but often 
are also the only regulations of money in politics, e.g. Criminal Code 
of Germany, 1871/1953,21 sec. 107 through 108d. As a result, bribery in 
elections has disappeared in general. It must be added, however, that 
it is not always easy to distinguish between bribery and legitimate con-
tributions, as money is transferred in both cases and motivations are 
hard to detect.22 
Limitations 
To rule out bribery and other corrupt practices helped to remove 
the worst abuses of money in politics. The basic inequality of candidates 
and parties resulting from their different financial situations was not 
changed, however. The party of' greater means continued to have an advan-
tage over the other side by outspending it on a large scale. Even when 
the size of the funds was not the decisive factor in the outcome of the 
campaign, it often seemed to be so or the losing candidate at least tried 
to put the blame on it. To some people large contributions and expendi-
tures of money in politics were suspicious as such, regardless of how the 
sums were used. The remedy was seen in a control of the large amounts 
of money flowing through the money chests of candidates and party 
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treasurers by imposing maximum limits on contributions and expenditures. 
This opinion gained strong support in several countries, especially in 
Great Britain and the United States at the end of the nineteenth century, 
but has also met with heavy opposition. 
Contributions 
In most countries, limitations on political contributions are 
not so far reaching as on expenditures. The general rule is that money 
from some sources is completely outlawed, while other sources are re-
stricted to certain amounts. 
Protection of public employees from political assessment by the 
party in power23 was among the earliest concems of legislative action. 
In the United States, the first federal act was passed in 1867.24 Its 
provisions were extended by the Civil Service Reform (Pendleton) Act25 
in 1883 in which the basic regulation was laid down which is still 
valid. The Act prohibited the solicitation of campaign funds from 
federal employees by other federal employees and by all other persons on 
federal premises.26 On the state level, New York and Pennsylvania made 
a beginning by enacting laws in 1883 which prohibited the solicitation 
and assessment of their officials; other states followed shortly.27 In 
1966, nineteen states had such provisions. 28 In general, this kind of 
29 legislation has proved to be successful. 
Business and labor, as the two largest outside sources of politi-
cal contributions, have been in the focus of restrictive legislation in 
• many countries. In Puerto Rico, contributions of persons, corporations, 
and organizations were restricted by the 1957 law granting public 
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subsidies to political parties.3° Contributions from corporations are 
31 prohibited in the Philippines. In recent years, the Japanese have--
rather unsuccessfully--tried to forbid "election," not "regular," contri-
32 butions of corporations and unions. In Great Britain, no restrictions 
on contributions by individuals, corporations, or trade unions exist.33 
Trade union members, however, may "contract out," i.e. declare in 
writing that they do not want their dues to be used for political con-
tributions.84 Between 1927 and 1946, this legal clause had been changed 
into a "contracting in," meaning that union members had to give their 
express consent, if the union wanted to use their dues for political 
contributions.35 "Contracting out" also exists in Norway, but only a 
few are opposed to these contributions, because local branches and not 
the more distant national unions decide -~pon the use of the dues. 36 
Pollock37 and Lewinsohn38 mentioned a legal device to curb business 
used in some European countries such as.Austria, Czechoslovakia, France 
and Poland. It was declared incompatible to be a deputy in parliament 
and, at the same time, to hold an official position in business. The 
combination had provided business with a direct representation in the 
legislature so that it needed no lobbyists and parliament had become 
an assembly of interest groups. 38 
The most comprehensive legislation in regard to business and 
labor contributions has been enacted in the United States. The first 
federal law, the Tillman Act,39 was passed in 1907. It prohibited con-
tributions by national banks and corporations in elections of federal 
officers. These prohibitions were later included in the Federal Corrupt 
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Practices Act of 192s.40 The regulation was extended to labor unions 
for a limited time by the War Labor Disputes (Smith-Connally) Act in 
194341 and made permanent in 1947 by the Labor-Management Relations 
(Taft-Hartley) Act. 42 The present legal provisions on labor and business 
money in politics are found in 15 U.S. Code 79 (l)(h); 1964(=Public 
Utility Holding Companies); 18 U.S. Code 610, 611; 1964(=National Banks, 
Corporations, and Labor Organizations). Regulation in the states has 
followed the federal example. In 1966, thirty-three states had some 
kind of prohibition of contributions by corporations, but only five by 
43 labor unions. The reason for preventing political contributions by 
business and labor was said to be the protection of minorities within 
the corporations and unions. There might be shareholders or union 
members who do not want to see their money go to party X but would pre-
fer party Y or no party at all. The actual reason, however, especially 
in the case of labor unions, was the power which these groups can 
mobilize by means of their financial reeources.44 Large amounts of labor 
money had been contributed to influence politics, beginning with the 
presidential elections in 1936 when $770,000 were given to the Democratic 
side. 45 
Justification and practicability of the ban against business and 
labor contributions are heavily disputed. Some want to see the rigid 
prohibition removed from both business and labor; others only from labor, 
and still others support a tightening of the present regulations. A 
different treatment of labor and business would be justified, if these 
two economic groups were genuinely distinct as far as money in politics 
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is concerned. Supporters of the differentiation argument bring forward 
several points: (1) a labor union is an organized group with a broad 
range of traditionally political and economic activities, while a corpor-
ation has only the narrow economic goal of making a profit;46 (2) if 
unions and corporations were treated equally, the latter would have an 
advantage as they enjoy a "political head start" by their domination of 
mass information media;47 (8) as far as minority rights are concemed, 
their protection is better guaranteed in labor unions than in corpora-
48 tions; and (4) it is easier for a stockholder to leave a corporation 
than for a union member to change his organization.49 
None of these arguments is sufficient for a differentiation 
between unions and corporations. If minority rights are not as well UH 
protected in corporations as in unions, a law could be enacted guarantee-
ing a stronger voice to shareholders in the decision over political 
contributions, maybe according to the per head rather than the per share 
principle. That corporations have a head start over unions is question-
able, because unions generally have parallel goals, while corporations 
in different economic branches ~ompete with each other and may often 
hav~ opposite views. The first argument brought forward by the supporters 
of a differentiation is the weakest one of all. Not the more or less 
wide range of union or corporate activities in general is important, but 
the narrow goal of both groups as far as financial contributions for 
political purposes is concemed: to gain economic privileges by influ-
encing the political process. In this respect both interconnect their 
economic power with their political interest and are alike.so A 
50 
different treatment of political contributions by labor unions and 
business corporations, therefore, is not justified. 
This answer still leaves open the second question, whether labor 
and business contributions should be banned or not. This question falls 
into a theoretical part; if such a prohibition is constitutional and 
democratic, and a practical part, if such a prohibition can be enforced. 
Political contributions by corporatione have been prohibited for sixty 
years, by labor unions for more than twenty years, but the U. S. Supreme 
Court has always avoided the constitutional problem involved by a broad 
interpretation of the law. 51 The constitutionality of sec. 610 of 
Title 18 of the u. s. Code is questionable with special regard to the 
right of free speech guaranteed in the First Amendment of the U. s. 
Constitution. There is no serious attempt to deny this right to corpora-
52 tions or labor unions, but the limits of the right are not certain. 
Freedom of speech in modern society is meaningful only if accompanied 
by the use of mass communication media. As these are expensive, the 
right of free speech must also imply the right to spend money for it. 
The expenditure of money as such, therefore, is no criterion for defining 
the limits of the freedom of speech. On the other hand, the right of 
free speech is to guarantee the expression and dissemination of opinion. 
This definitely means the right to make one's own opinion known, but not 
necessarily to give financial support to others so that they can make 
their opinion known. Therefore, expenditures made by corporations or 
labor unions to express their opinions are protected by the First Amend-
ment, but not financial contributions made to political parties or 
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candidates. 58 This interpretation remains doubtful, however, as it can 
be argued that an opinion is either protected by the Constitution or 
not, and, if so, that it is irrelevant who enables its dissemination 
financially. 
As often with problems of this kind where complex interests and 
powerful groups are involved, the answer cannot be found by a mere 
theoretical examination. Even if the above distinction were recognized, 
it would immediately create new questions. Would a union or corporation 
be allowed to express its own opinion in such a way as to support a 
particular party or candidate? As to the effect, there is hardly any 
difference whether a party or a candidate receives money so that they 
can express their opinions themselves or whether their opinion is ex-
pressed by others. The u. s. Congress enacted a very far-reaching 
prohibition of business and labor money in politics by using in sec. 610 
such wide terms as "expenditures and contributions" and "in connection 
54 with." Lambert goes so far as to declare the provision unconstitu-
tional because of its vagueness. In its practical application the pro-
vision, as similar regulations,in other countries, has been less harmful 
to corporations and labor unions. The degree of enforcement of a law 
often reflects the general opinion about its justification. Therefore, 
the effect of the regulations concerning business and labor contributions 
and expenditures must be examined next. 
The majority of observers agree that sec. 610 has not limited 
political contributions by corporations and labor unions, but only changed 
the practices by which the money is channeled into the political process. 
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A careful analysis by the Office of the u. s. Attomey General revealed 
that between 1950 and 1956 out of 54 complaints received conceming 
sec. 610, 49 were investigated and 14 presented to a grand jury; for two 
an indictment was obtained and one actually brought to trial, but later 
55 56 acquitted. Lambert, in 1962, reported that no corporation has everi: 
been successfully indicted under the provision in almost sixty years. 
The main reason is that the law, despite its sweeping prohibitions, has 
loopholes which are diligently used by the groups concerned. Corpora-
tions evade the law by giving extra high salaries or special bonuses to 
their executives with the expectation that these make political contri-
butions. They furnish services "in kind," such as office equipment and 
staff, mailing lists, and the assistance of public relation firms or 
lawyers. 57 While these practices probably are in violation of sec. 610, 
this is less true for another type of support, the so-called educational 
58 activities, such as institutional advertising on political issues. 
The American labor unions have tried to escape the legal ban by 
establishing so-called independent committees. As early as 1943, the 
year of the Smith-Connally Act,59 the CIO set up a Political Action 
Committee (PAC). 60 The AFL followed in 1947 with a Labor's League for 
Political Education. 61 With the merger of APL and ClO, a joint Committee 
on Political Education (COPE) was founded in 1955.62 The courts have 
upheld the claim of these groups that they are independent of their 
unions and promoters of educational, not political, activities, and 
therefore are neither "labor organizations" nor make "contributions" to 
political parties and candidates within the meaning of sec. 610. 68 
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Business uses a similar device in the form of the National Association 
of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce, the Business-Industry Politi-
cal Action Conunittee (BIPAC), or the American Medical Association 
Political Activities Committee {AMPAC). 64 The classification of expen-
ditures of these groups as "educational" leaves labor and business a 
possibility to use funds for political purposes. Difficult as the 
distinction between educational and political expenditures may be, the 
courts have agreed to it, probably because of the rigidity of the law 
and the serious conflicts with First Amendment rights which otherwise 
would arise. 65 In practice, the line has been drawn in such a way that 
activities, which are primarily directed at the members of the organiza-
tion, are regarded as "educational," while those activities which are 
primarily directed at non-members are regarded as "political." It does 
not matter whether the action, when it is primarily directed at one 
group, accidentally reaches the other. 66 Another method which might be 
used in addition defines issue-oriented propaganda as "educational" and 
candidate- or party-oriented propaganda as "political." COPE has two 
funds, an educational and a pol~tical one. Only the first is made up 
of regular union fees; the second consists of small voluntary contribu-
tions by union members. Candidates or parties are supported only from 
this latter fund. There have been observed, however, some peculiar 
methods of collecting "voluntary" contributions. Two unions developed 
the practice, which was upheld by au. s. District Court in Missouri, of 
asking their members if they wanted to contribute part of their regular 
dues to a political fund. Most of them did because no extra burden was 
54 
involved.69 How difficult it is to decide which activities are educa-
tional and which political was demonstrated by a controversy between 
COPE Co-Director James L. McDevitt and Senator Goldwater (Arizona) about 
the publication of candidates' voting records.70 Though many observers 
are critical of the value of the distinction and some consider it mean-
ingless, under the present legislation it seems to be the only way to 
prevent serious constitutional problems and to fulfill the practical 
need for a flow of money from these two most powerful financial sources 
into the political process. 
As long as large contributions play such an important role in 
financing the activities of political parties, the prohibition of 
political contributions by business and labor will be circumvented by 
those who need the money and by those who have it. Stricter enforcement 
of the present restrictive legislation, as recommended by the Presidentts 
Commission and others,71 cannot be demanded and will not be effective 
before the parties have changed their financial basis. Doubts about the 
rigid prohibitions were expressed by Louise Overacker72 as early as 1946. 
With regard to the present practices and needs, a more realistic regula-
tion would have to allow political contributions by labor unions and 
corporations;73 whether under some restrictions will be discussed later.74 
A unique feature of the regulation of political finances is the 
restriction imposed on individual contributions in the United States. 
The Hatch Political Activities Acts of 193975 and of 194076 have limited 
the annual political contribution by an individual to an aggregate amount 
of not more than $5,000 to or in behalf of any one federal candidate or 
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political committee. 77 Similar restrictions with limitations between 
$1,000 and $5,000 exist on the state level, but in 1966 only in seven 
states.78 As with business and labor contributions, constitutional and 
practical questions arise. The constitutional problem is basically the 
same in both cases, with the difference that the limits on individual 
contributions seem large enough as to be undue restrictions, especially 
79 when viewed from the point of equal chances for each voter. The regu-
lation has not achieved, however ( if this was ever intended by the makers 
of the Hatch Act),80 to force individuals to contribute not more than 
$5,000 a year to one candidate. The law does not prevent an individual 
from ~ontributing the maximum amount to different committees even if they 
support the same candidate, or to have the family contribute money which 
comes out of his pocket.81 The more effective limit of the size of each 
individual political contribution is determined by the federal gift tax 
at $3,000 a year. 82 A table made up by Heard83 clearly shows a cluster-
ing of large individual contributions at $8,000. Political committees 
may feel less dependent on single givers because they cannot expect more 
than the legal maximum amount f~om them,84 but candidates know very well 
who the big contributors are and that these are able to give more than 
the fixed amount to a candidate's campaign. In this respect, the Hatch 
Act has offered no improvement. 
Limitations on contributions have not been successful, on the 
whole, if their purpose is to restrict some sources of political financ-
ing completely and others to certain maximum amounts. Though it is true 
that the legal provisions have "loopholes," it is doubtful whether the 
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situation would be different under stricter regulations. Reduction of 
large contributions must be accompanied by a simultaneous improvement of 
other sources of political financing, otherwise it will be a failure. 
Expenditures 
Limitations of expenditures are of two kinds. Candidates or 
parties can be restricted either by a fixed maximum amount of money 
which they are allowed to spend or by detailed regulations as to the 
purpose for which the funds can be used. 
In Great Britain, legal limitations on total expenditures have 
existed since the enactment of the Corrupt and Illegal Practices Act of 
1883. At present, the Representation of the People Act of 1918/4985 
restricts a candidate in an urban district to t450 and an additional 
1.5 pennies per registered voter, 2 pennies in a rural district. 86 
Furthermore, the candidate is limited to certain kinds of expenditures. 87 
There are no restrictions on parties, however. A similar regulation 
exists in Australia. 88 Legal limits on amounts of campaign spending 
have also been introduced in Japan. 89 The sum was determined by dividing 
the number of registered voters by the number of representatives and by 
multiplying the result by about l cent (4 yen),90 but is now fixed for 
all candidates at a flat $2,800 (l million yen).91 In addition, the 
candidates are restricted in their propaganda. Door-to-door canvassing 
of voters, gifts of food, drink or money, campaign parades and demonstra-
tions are prohibited, and the candidates may give no more than sixty 
campaign speeches.92 In Israel, the Elections (Modes of Propaganda) Law 
of 1959 has imposed restrictions on the size of posters, entertainment 
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93 · programs, exhibition of films, etc. After high expenditures in the 
Italian elections of 1953, campaigns were shortened to six weeks before.I 
94 election day and posters limited in their size, number and location. 
The Turkish Election of National Deputies A~t of 1950 allows campaign 
posters during election periods only in designated places, with equal 
space allotted to parties and independent candidates (Art. 58). No 
posters or pamphlets may be distributed within two days before election 
day (Art. 56). 95 Detailed provisions as .to posters and pamphlets exist 
in France. Each candidate is allowed two posters to proclaim his pro-
gram, two other posters to announce his campaign rallies, one pamphlet 
may be sent out to each voter, and a number of ballots up to two times 
the number of registered voters plus 20 percent may also be sent out.96 
The size is prescribed and the law even prohibits the candidates to use 
white posters or posters with the colors of the national flag for 
distinction from government announcements.97 
In the United States, the legal emphasis lies more on fixing a 
maximum amount of expenditures than on restricting the purpose .for which 
the money can be used. The first regulation was enacted by California 
and Missouri in 1893;98 the first federal law dates back to 1911.99 In 
1966, thirty states had some limitations on expenditures. In twenty-one 
states, the limitations were imposed only on candidates but not on 
committees supporting them, which made the limits practically meaningless. 
Restrictions on the purpose of political expenditures existed in twenty-
nine states.100 Regulations of the latter kind are not contained in the 
federal law, but it limits candidates for the U.S. House of Representatives 
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to a maximum expenditure of $5,000i candidates for the U. s. Senate to 
$25,ooo,101 and political committees operating in more than one state to 
$3 million.102 
Practical experience with the legal restrictions·on expenditures 
has been different in the various countries. Observers of the British 
system have come to opposite conclusions. Louise Overacker,103 in the 
early l930's, called the program effective and reported that expenditures 
had been cut down as a result of the strict accountability of the candi-
dates, but at the same time she pointed out the weakness of the law as 
it did not cover the parties. A sharp deduction of campaign costs was 
also observed by Harrison104 in 1963, and Lucas105 wrote in the mid-
l950's that the system worked. On the other hand, Newman,106 after a 
careful analysis in Great Britain, gave a very critical summary in 1957. 
Reported amounts of expenditures included only a small fraction of the 
actual expenditures because of the weakness of the law--compulsory 
reporting starts only a few weeks before election day--and its half-
hearted enforcement. The last conviction took place in 1928, the last 
protest was filed in 1924; since then "gentlemen's agreements" have set 
the standards rather than official interpretation. A wide gap between 
legally allowable and actual expenditures exists in Japan.107 A legis-
lator estimated the money needed to be five or six times more than the 
legal limit.108 "Ordinary" candidates, in 1960, spent $14,000 {5 million 
yen), "top" candidates $28,000 and $56,000 {10 and 20 million yen).109 
The restriction of expenditures for certain purposes in Israel has led 
the parties only to spend huge sums in other ways, as the size of the 
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parties' election budgets indicates.110 Election expenditures in France, 
despite the detailed regulations mentioned above, escape any practical 
111 control. 
Ceilings on expenditures imposed on candidates and political 
committees in the United States have never been an effective means, 
according to almost unanimous opinion of the experts, scientists as well 
as politicians. If ceilings are not thought to be worthless in general, 
the blame is usually put on the inadequate size of the limits which, 
fixed at a particular time, does not take into account the development 
of new campaign techniques and the rising cost of living.112 While some 
states tried to adjust their regulations to the actual needs by raising 
the ceilings from time to time or by dropping them completely,113 no 
changes have been made in the federal law. The unrealistic and rigid 
limitations, as they·are sometimes called, have led to a broad interpre-
tation of the law and to a variety of practices which make the limits 
almost meaningless. Two major reasons are responsible for this situation. 
The maximum limitations are imposed on political committees, not on 
political parties,114 and not all political committees are covered.115 
Furthermore, coverage of primary elections is rather incomplete.116 
Since only political committees are restricted to the maximum amount of 
expenditures and not parties, as many political connnittees can be set up 
as the party desires, and each of them can spend up to the maximum 
amount of $3 million. This has led to an increase in the number of com-
mittees, though the "proliferation" was not too great.117 Probably the 
reason simply is that the ceiling of $3 million is not so easily reached 
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that a splitting up into subcommittees has often been necessary. Not 
the actual number of committees is important, however, but the fact that 
an additional committee can be created whenever the existing ones reach 
the legal ceiling. Furthermore, the federal law does not cover all com-
mittees supporting federal candidates, but only those committees and 
their subsidiaries which operate in two or more states. All state and 
local committees of a national party are excluded whether they support 
a federal candidate or not; branches of national committees are subject 
to the federal law, however. State and local committees may be subject 
to state laws, but these are often rather inefficient. Another weak 
point of the federal law is that it does not cover candidates for the 
office of president or vice-president, because not they but only their 
electors are legally candidates. Committees in their behalf are covered, 
however, but only after the nomination.118 
This survey of several countries shows that, if special activi-
ties are limited or prohibited, the money is spent as effectively in 
other ways; and that, if ceilings are imposed, they are circumvented 
when they are too low, and meaningless when they are too high. No better 
results can be expected from voluntary actions of the parties themselves. 
The major parties in Germany, where no legal restrictions on expenditures 
exist, set up an agreement on the matter for the 1965 election campaign, 
but the limits were so high that they were hardly a restriction.119 On 
the whole, attempts to limit political expenditures have been as unsuccess-
ful as those to restrict political contributions. 
Reforms 
Ceilings on political contributions and expenditures have fre-
quently been debated in the U. s. Congress for the last decades. 
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Several bills were introduced almost every year, especially in the 
Senate, committee hearings held, and reports made, but the bills rarely 
received floor action. Only in 1961 did the Senate pass a bill, but it 
died in the House. In general, the reform proposals suggested to raise 
the present ceilings, up to about $50,000 for a candidate for the u. s. 
Senate, up to about $12,500 or $25 1000 for a candidate for the u. s. 
House of Representatives, or to a considerably higher amount to be based 
on the number of votes received in the previous election, on the n\Dllber 
of registered voters, or on the population and by multiplying the number 
by ten or twenty cents. Expenditures of national committees were also 
to be raised, from the present $3 million to sorne'$10 or $15 million.120 
While most legislators would like to retain limitations in 
principle and only rais·e the ceilings, the majority of political scien-
tists are more inclined to abolish ceilings altogether.121 Several argu-
ments are brought forward for t~e latter suggestion-of which the most 
frequent and probably best one is that limitations cannot be enforced; 
furthermore, that the size of political contributio_ns, if left alone, is 
a good indicator for the popular support of the party,122 that there is 
no fair way to determine the lirnits,128 and that the ceilings would have 
to be revised continuously in order to remain adequate.124 In the last 
years, reform proposals have begun to differentiate. The Florida law of 
1951 abolished limits on expenditures but retained limits of $1,000 per 
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year on individual contributions and prohibited contributions from some 
sources, such as horse and dog race enterprises, liquor business, and 
certain public utilities.125 In 1962, Massachusetts followed suit and 
removed restrictions on expenditures, but not on contributions.126 After 
the President's Commission,127 in 1962, had reported that the "imposition 
of 'realistic ceilings' would only create a false impression of limita-
tions," President Kennedy128 suggested the removal of limitations upon 
receipts· and expenditures. President Johnson's "Election Reform Act of 
1966,"129 however, would repeal only the ceilings on expenditures, but 
retain and improve those on contributions. Those who suggest that ceil-
ings should be abolished, in part or as a whole, prefer a better system 
of reporting and publicizing political financing instead. The final 
consideration of the problem of legal ceilings on political contributions 
and expenditures, therefore, must be postponed until the system of public 
disclosure has been discussed.130 
Experience with restricting the purposes for which the money can 
be spent in France, Israel and Japan shows that candidates and parties 
comply with the law, but find ~ufficient other ways to spend large 
amounts of money.131 It is doubtful whether an extension of the list 
containing the restricted activities would improve the situation because 
the ways to spend the money for propaganda are too numerous. Furthermore, 
the tightening could force parties and candidates to evade the law, if 
they are too limited in their activities, as they do with ceilings which 
are too low. The same would probably be true if a positive list were 
made up which would allow the parties and candidates to use only certain 
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kinds of propaganda; such a plan would also prevent innovations in 
propaganda techniques. 
Two other devices--shorter campaign periods and compulsory regis-
tration:- and voting--have been included in reform suggestions, but are 
not promising. Short campaign period~ would handicap the newcomer and 
give additional advantage to the incwnbent candidate who could start his 
propaganda before the beginning of the campaign under the disguise of 
his public position.132 A Florida experiment to shorten the campaign 
period revealed that the candidates only spent their money faster. 133 
Compulsory registration and voting have saved the parties in Australia 
considerable costs, as they do not have to invest money for getting 
voters to the polls.134 The problem, however, is that in many countries 
democratic tradition stands in the way of making the vote compulsory. In 
the United States, a simplification of registration procedures would 
already lower the costs for the parties.135 
The preceding discussion shows that a remedy for the problem of 
political financing cannot be found in legal restrictions, at least not 
alone. 
Disclosure 
The restriction of political parties and candidates to maximum 
sums which they can receive or spend and to certain purposes for which 
they can use their funds has not been the only attempt to regulate politi-
cal financing. Another legal device is the public disclosure of financial 
transactions in which parties and candidates engage. The underlying 
philosophy of this approach is the idea that the publication of political 
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contributions and expenditures has a "cleansing and policing power"lS6 
which is even more effective than the imposition of ceilings. Effective 
publicity is regarded as a kind of automatic regulation which assures 
financial accountability and public confidence by increasing the politi-
cal risk for siniate~ actions.137 This belief and the unsatisfactory 
experience with limitations imposed on political contributions and 
expenditures have convinced observers, especially in the United States, 
that a system of public disclosure is superior to one of maximum ceil-
ings. Therefore, they would like to see limitations repealed and substi-
tuted by effective publicity provisions.138 Opponents point out that the 
public is too apathetic to be a realistic check and demand at least some 
additional limitations in the form of maximum amounts.139 
Experience in!!!!, United States 
In the United States, federal regulations requiring publicity of 
political finance have existed for more than half a century, in the 
states since the end of the nineteenth century. The first national 
publicity law was passed in 1910.140 The provisions were included in the 
Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, after some amendments had been 
enacted in the preceding decade.141 The first state publicity law was 
enacted in 1890 by New York.142 In 1966, all but seven states required 
143 some disclosure of political funds. Much more than in other countries 
with legal restrictions on political finance, compulsory publicity has 
been a major feature of the American attempt to promote faimess in the 
realm of political contributions and expenditures. Though the system 
has provided the American public with more information about political 
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finance than is available anywhere else,144 it has not fulfilled the 
expectations of its promoters.145 This is due to several deficiencies 
in the law. Despite some kind of legal regulation in forty-three 
states, this does not mean that all of these states require disclosure of 
contributions and expenditures from candidates and committees in primary 
and general elections, before and after election day. In 1966, all of 
these requirements existed in only ten states.146 
The federal law. as it is laid down, seems to be rather effec-
tive. Reports must be submitted under oath by political committees, 
candidates, and individuals, and are open to public inspection. In de-
tail, political committees must have a treasurer who keeps a record of 
all receipts and expenditures which shows totals and also gives details 
as to name, address, and date, if a contribution is $100 or more and an 
expenditure of $10 or more. A report must be submitted to the Clerk of 
the U. s. House of Representatives every three months and a copy retained 
for two years. The January report must contain the totals for the pre-
vious calendar year. Additional reports are required between the fif-
teenth and tenth day and on the, fifth day before an election.147 Candi-
dates for the u. s. Congress have to submit reports between the fifteenth 
and tenth day before and within thirty days after an election. The_ 
reports must state each contribution received and each expenditure made 
by the candidate or by other persons for him with his knowledge or con-
148 sent. Individuals making direct expenditures, i.e. not to a political 
committee, of $50 or more in a calendar year in order to influence elec-
tions in two or more states must also file a report.149 The deficiencies 
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of the law become more apparent when not only its positive requirements 
are presented, but also what it does not cover sufficiently. Like the 
provisions limiting contributions and expenditures, the regulations of 
publicity do not extend to candidates for president or vice-president, 
to committees operating in one state only-~with the exception of branches 
of national. committees--or to primary elections.150 
The most important inadequacy, however, is the failure of the 
law to assure genuine publicity of the reported information. In general, 
the required reports are submitted, but the receiving agencies do not 
have to do more than to preserve them for two years and to keep them 
open to the public.151 They have no power to check and reprimand 
insufficiencies. Interested people may look into the submitted state-
ments, but this is inconvenient and useful results cannot be obtained 
without great effort. Access to the places where the reports are kept 
is allowed only during working hours, and data collection is made diffi-
cult.152 Even Senate committees must sometimes get special permission 
for photocopying from the Speaker of the House.153 Infonnation is often 
incomplete and unintelligible; ~hove all, no standard form for the 
reports is required so that the statements are hardly comparable.154 
To improve the present system in the United States, not many 
changes are necessary, because most states have some basic provisions. 
A survey in 1952 showed that information was most valuable in those 
states which required reports of expenditures and contributions from 
candidates and committees, in primary and general elections, on a stand-
ard form under some government inspection and with a central depository.155 
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Most reform proposals for the federal law include primary elections, 
presidential and vice-presidential candidates, and all committees sup-
porting federal candidates. They also suggest a standard reporting 
form and a central federal repository which receives the reports and 
checks them as to their completeness.156 
Publication 
At present, two states publish the reported information in 
official state summaries.157 Oregon distributes a summary of 40 to 80 
pages which contains a compilation of contributions and expenditures for 
each candidate and committee, for the primary, and the general election. 
Massachusetts prints data concerning primary and general election 
finance in a public document. Information is less detailed than in 
t 
Oregon, but lists total amounts. Such a government publication seems 
to be necessary only as a basis for further evaluation by the press, 
because the mass media are better apt to reach the citizen.158 Standard-
ized party reports would probably be sufficient, however. At present, 
one of the most valuable sources of information is the hearings and 
reports made by Congressional committees. In Great Britain, the return-
ing officer in each constituency has to publish a summary of the reports 
which are submitted to him, in at least two newspapers.159 Pollock160 
observed that the public did not ta'ke great notice of the publication, 
but that it still put pressure on the candidates. The Home Office 
publishes financial accounts of candidates for Parliament in a paper 
called '1Retum of Election Expenses. "161 
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Instead of having such summaries prepared by the government, 
they could be required from the political parties on an annual basis. 
In Kansas, accounts of state committees are audited annually by a 
certified public accountant and copies must be filed with the Secretary 
of State.162 The draft of a German party law of 1959163 similarly 
requires each party to submit an annual account to the superintendent of 
federal elections after it has been audited by a certified public account-
ant (sec. 22). The superintendent has to publish the account and the 
remark of the public accountant in the bulletin of the federal govern-
ment (sec. 22, 28). In sec. 23 through 26 the draft gives details as to 
the contents of the accounts and the way in which the parties must pre-
serve and present the relevant data. 
Situation in Germany~ Japan 
At present, the German parties are not required to disclose 
their finances. According to Art. 21, sec. 1, subsec. 4 of the Basic 
Law of 1949, political parties "must publicly account for the sources of 
their funds," but in sec. 3 of the same article it says that "details 
will be regulated by federal l~gislation." The general opinion is that 
without a comprehensive party law the provision about public account-
ability is isolated and cannot meaningfully be enforced.164 On a volun-
tary basis, the Social Democratic party publishes annual reports of its 
financial situation.165 In Japan, the "Political Fund Registration Law" 
requires the political parties to report contributions and expenditures. 
The reports understate the amounts, however, and do not reflect the 
accurate picture. Factions within the Conservative party have set up 
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organizations with innocuous titles for the purpose of collecting addi-
tional political funds.166 
Financial Agent 
Publicity of political contributions and expenditures is mean-
ingful only if completeness is assured. All money spent for political 
purposes must be reported. Statements filed by candidates and political 
committe~s would not reflect a complete picture, if other persons inade 
additional direct expenditures on behalf of a candidate or a party. A 
device to concentrate responsibility of political finance in a few hands 
was first introduced by the British law in the form of the fiscal agent. 
Bersons who want to support the election campaign of a candidate must 
give their aid to the candidate or his agent; they are not allowed to 
spend it directly.167 The candidate may name himself as his agent, but 
then is subject to stricter regulations.168 The principle has been 
adopted by several American states, such as Florida, Massachusetts, New 
Hampshire, and New Jersey.169 A survey of political scientists and 
fonner u. s. Senators, taken by the McClellan Senate collDUittee170 in 
1956, showed that a large majority were in favor of the agent system. 
Propo~als to concentrate financial activities of political committees in 
the person of one treasurer have appeared in several Congressional bills, 
such as S.604 introduced by Senator Long of Missouri in 1961,171 s.1623 
by Senator Gore of Tennessee in 1961,172 President Johnson's "Election 
Refonn Act 1966,11173 and S.2541, sec. 20l(a),174 the only bill which 
received a conunittee hearing in the S~nate in 1966. The American "model" 
law in regard to the agent principle is the Florida law of 1951.175 Each 
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candidate must appoint a campaign treasurer and designate a campaign 
depository in order to qualify.176 All money and things of value contri-
buted to or expended on behalf of the candidate must go through the 
hands of the treaeurer.177 Last-minute and post-election contributions 
are prohibited as well as campaign indebtedness.178 Reports must be 
ll9 · filed before and after election day. Up to 1962 more than 95 percent 
of the total contributions and expenditures in each campaign were 
reported prior to election day.180 
Constitutional Problems 
Statutes which prohibit expenditures on behalf of a candidate, 
unless authorized by the candidate or his campaign treasurer, have met 
with opposition or at least doubts on constitutional grounds.181 In 
1916 the Supreme Court of Wisconsin182 declared a similar provision 
unconstitutional as violating the right of free speech. The Florida 
Supreme Court183 in 1958 upheld the agent provision of the 1951 law as 
a constitutional exercise of the police power of the state. To avoid 
the constitutional difficulties and not to curb interested persons from 
political participation, suggestions have been made to allow political 
committees which are not authorized by a candidate to support his cam-
paign under the express statement of this fact184 and to subject them to 
a maximum amount of expenditures.185 The express statement is to protect 
the candidate, whose reputation and interest are at stake, from unwelcome 
supporters.186 Another proposal is to oblige the treasurer to accept any 
aid, if it comes from a legally permitted source.187 An altemative to 
the authorization system is a plan under which political committees can 
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be formed and act freely with the sole requirement of registering with a 
government official before they start their activities.188 The obliga-
tion to register may be limited to groups which expect to raise and 
spend a certain minimum amount of money per year or per election cam-
paign.189 The registration system would avoid conflict with constitu-
tional rights and insure complete freedom of political activity. To 
protect the candidates, the registered groups could be required to state 
whether they have his consent. 
The constitutionality of publicity laws is also questioned in 
the wider sense that disclosure of the names of contributors is an 
invasion of privacy and the secrecy of the ballot. In 1950, a special 
committee of the Norwegian Storting came to the latter conclusion, since 
it was generally assumed that the contributor to a party is also its 
190 voter. The Federal Government of Germany, in the draft of the party 
191 law of 1959, suggested a disclosure of contributions according to 
general categories but not according to the names of the individual con-
tributors (sec. 23). The government, giving the reasons, left open the 
question whether the disclosure of individual contributions violated the 
secrecy of the ballot and based its argument, instead, on Art. 5 of the 
Basic Law. This provision guarantees the freedom of expression which 
includes the freedom of holding back one's opinion. The freedom of 
expression is "limited by the provisions of the general laws" (Art. 5, 
sec. 2). A law requiring the publicity of the names of individual 
political contributors is not such a general law, according to the Federal 
Government.192 The u. s. Supreme Court has not yet been confronted with 
the problem. 
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The secrecy of the ballot is no argument against disclosure of 
contributors' names, because this device covers up only the political 
conviction of the voter, while it is assured that each of the persons 
acting under the protection exercises the same influence--one man, one 
vote. The secrecy of political contributions, however, would cover up 
quite different potential powers and help to transfer the financial 
inequality from the economic into the political area, thus distorting 
the--at· least assumed--equality of all citizens as to political rights. 
All citizens have only one vote to cast, but not all have the same amount 
of money to throw into the political process. Contributions can be kept 
secret only if financial equality is guaranteed in the political field, 
as, e.g., the tax assignment plan193 tries to do. The secrecy of poli-
tical contributions, therefore, is not comparable to the secrecy of the 
ballot. 
As to the constitutional right of free expression, the problem 
can only be solved by balancing the individual's right to keep his politi-
cal opinion to himself and the interest of society to lmow the persons 
who influence politics by money. By way of a compromise, contributors 
could be required to disclose their names if they spend an aggregate sum 
of a certain minimum amount per year or per election campaign.194 The 
inconveniences for contributors from publicity requirements should not be 
minimized. Heard195 reported of "harassment by the press and exploita-
tion by the opposition"; twenty percent of the contributions of $100 or 
more were made under false names, because the givers feared reprisals.196 
On the other hand, it should not be forgotten that everyone who expresses 
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a political opinion has to face public criticism. In a way, a financial 
contribution can be regarded as the expression of a political opinion, 
as it is an attempt to influence the political course. 
Usefulness£!_ Disclosure 
In addition to these problems, some practical questions as to 
the usefulness of public disclosure have been raised. The idea of public 
disclosure is that publicity leaves the final judgment on candidates and 
their financial support to the voters where it belongs.197 It is doubt-
ful, however, whether the public can exercise an actual check. Despite 
the new law in Florida which is thought to belong to the best of its 
kind, campaign expenditures and large contributions have risen in the 
state continuously, and the candidate with the highest expenditures has 
generally been successful.198 Large expenditures may, in the eyes of 
the public, reflect better fund-raising ability and greater popularity 
of the candidate, and not necessarily irregularities or unfair head 
199 start of wealth. Publicity laws bring, at best, contributions and 
expenditures to the daylight, but are hardly an effective means of 
cutting down the size of contributions and expenditures. In order to 
promote the desired effort of political parties to increase the number of 
small contributions, a public disclosure law should be combined with 
ceilings on contributions and expenditures. 
Enforcement 
Enforcement of the laws regulating political finance has been 
weak in almost every country. The unsuccessful attempts to restrict the 
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influence of money and big givers in such countries as Israel, Japan or 
the Philippines have already been discussed.200 Enforcement in Great 
Britain seems to be efficient, in general, though some doubts have been 
201 expressed. 
In the United States, the enforcement machinery is regarded unani-
mously as the weakest part of the regulation of political finance. Only 
about one-third of the states require an official inspection of the re-
ceived statements or a report of violations to the prosecuting officiai.202 
But even these provisions do not often lead to legal actions against 
offenders because of difficulties in finding evidence and showing willful 
violations of the law. 203 On the federal level, the situation is not 
better. Enforcement is practically non-existent, because the agencies 
receiving the reports are not charged with any other task than to pre-
serve them for two years.204 No other public office has to check the 
statements and report violations. The Justice Department has never 
prosecuted anyone for not complying with the Federal Corrupt Practices 
Act, though violations were revealed by the Press. 205 The Attorney 
General is reluctant to enforce this inadequate law.206 The policy of 
the Justice Department is to wait for reports of violations by the 
receiving agencies, the Clerk of the u. s. House and the Secretary of 
the U. s. Senate, but these have never submitted such information.207 
Congress itself has taken action twice, in 1927-28, against two elected 
Senators who were refused their seats because of excessive spending in 
their carnpaigns.208 
In the absence of effective public enforcement, action depends 
mainly on the initiative of rival candidates or committees, and 
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citizens.209 Court action against corrupt practices can be demanded by 
a group of five private citizens in Massachusetts,210 but since the 
enactment of the provision in 1946, no case has come up.2ll No private 
citizen can be expected to spend his time and money on such an intricate 
matter as the control of political finances. Candidates and committees 
are rarely interested in a pros6cution, either because their own record 
is not perfectly clean or because they do not want to be a "bad 
loser."212 
In general, clear violations of the law are rare, since provi-
sions are wide enough to stay within the letter of the statute.213 The 
present attitude which does not show much respect for the laws of 
political finance and regards violations as trivial offenses is mainly 
due to the wide interpretation of the statutes and the little attention 
given to them by the law-enforcing officials.214 From experience in 
Oregon215 and Maine,216 where an adequate law with sufficient penalties 
has been carefully enforced, it becomes evident that satisfactory reports 
can be obtained. What seems necessary, above all, is to fix the responsi-
bility for enforcing the statute on definite agencies which check, 
report, and prosecute violations. Without proper enforcement which 
guarantees prompt and certain punishment of violators, even the best law 
is meaningless. Basis for an efficient enforcement, on the other hand, 
is only a law with realistic restrictions. 
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CHAPTER 111 
PUBLIC SUBSIDIES 
Support of Specific Political~ 
Governments have not only restricted the use of money in politics, 
but also tried to help the parties defray their costs. Political parties 
are a connecting link between the private sphere of the citizen and the 
public area of government, with activities extending into both. General 
opinion in most countries is that the parties should be reimbursed for 
costs which they incur when performing public tasks, but that they should 
spend their own money when being engaged in private party work. The 
demarcation line between public and private activities of political 
parties is difficult to draw and depends on personal opinion and tradi-
tional background in the particular country. 
Election Coste 
In most countries, the state at first took over voter registra-
tion and poll administration, mainly in order to safeguard elections 
against irregularities which had occurred under party control. State 
administration of registration and voting prevails in Europe, while in 
most of the United States the parties have to invest their funds to get 
the citizens out to register and vote.1 Other heavy burdens on American 
parties and candidates are the costs for poll watchers in order to assure 
a fair election,2 for recounts in order to clarify close elections, and 
for the transition period between election and inauguration day of public 
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3 officials. These are thought to be proper state functions and, there-
fore, should be paid from government funds as is done with other election 
costs. 4 In Norway, which has a convention system, the state even pays 
travel and subsistence expenses of delegates to county and area conven-
tions.5 In principle, agreement exists almost everywhere that the state 
has to pay for election costs; differences arise only about the range of 
these costs. 
Propaganda Costs 
Several countries have gone beyond the reimbursement or asswnp-
tion of the costs for voter registration and poll administration. They 
help the parties defray part of their costs for specific means and 
facilities of propaganda. A greater help for the public administration 
of elections than for the private propaganda of the parties is the state 
support of the costs of sending out sample ballots. This device makes 
citizens acquainted with the voting procedures but not with the views of 
the parties or candidates. Some American states print and distribute 
sample ballots, three--California,'Nevada, New Jersey--mail them to the 
voters, and twelve have them publicized in newspapers {1966).6 In Great 
Britain, an official poll card is sent out to inform the voters of their 
election number and polling station.7 A similar notification is distri-
buted to each eligible voter in Germany. 8 In France, the state reimburses 
the costs of paper and printing of the ballots which each candidate is 
allowed to send out,9 if he gets more than five percent of the votes 
cast.10 
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Of more direct help are public subsidies for some other activi-
ties. In Great Britain, candidates may use public halls for their 
political rallies at nominal charges.11 Local authorities in France,12 
lsraei,13 and Turkey14 put up special billboards to be used for election 
posters. It should be noted that these provisions, at the same time, 
limit the parties and candidates to put their posters in the designated 
places so that the regulation is also restrictive.15 In addition, the 
French government reimburses the costs of paper and printing, and putting 
up of the posters, if the candidate receives more than five percent of 
the votes cast.16 In Japan, the candidates are given a specific number 
of posters by the government. In addition, the government pays a small 
newspaper advertisement for each candidate.17 A similar practice exists 
in some American states which publicize lists of candidates, ballot 
issues, or constitutional amendments in the press.18 
Another important aid is the subsidization of costs for postage. 
In Great Britain, candidates can send one letter free to each voter.19 
In Japan, each candidate is given a specific number of postcards which he 
can send out to the voters.20 The French government supports the costs 
of sending out the legally permitted number of circulars and ballots.21 
Granting a franking privilege to.all candidates is recommended in the 
United States, because the free use of postal service by members of 
Congress gives the incumbent candidate a considerable advantage over his 
opponent, even though the incumbent may not use the franking privilege 
for campaign propaganda.22 
To make the voters acquainted with the candidates and issues, 
some governments subsidize election pamphlets. In France, the government, 
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besides bearing the costs of sending out the circulars, reimburses the 
costs of paper and printing, if the candidate gets more than five per-
cent of the votes cast.23 A free brochure, containing information about 
the candidates and their points of view, is distributed to the eligible 
voters in Japan. 24 Several American states distributed election pamph-
lets to the electorate at government expense, but most of them repealed 
this institution. At present, only Oregon, which also had been the first 
state to adopt the practice in 1907, publishes an election pamphlet.25 
Opinion as to the usefulness of such a comprehensive booklet, containing 
information about all candidates and issues, is diverse. The material 
was often monotonous in its presentation; parties and candidates did not 
make great use of the device, partly because of the costs, partly 
because the voters did not seem to read the pamphlets, and the parties 
had to use other campaign literature.26 On the other hand, Senator 
Maurine Neuberger27 of Oregon reported that the voters found the pamph-
lets a useful publication. The reason why most states abolished the 
device, nevertheless, was probably its cost to the states, though the 
costs did not amount to large sums, e.g. in North Dakota, up to five 
cents, in Oregon up to fourteen cents per voter.28 
At the present stage of propaganda techniques, the most important 
aid which the state can give to parties and candidates is the subsidizing 
of broadcasts. In those countries where radio and television are run by 
the government or are organized as semi-public institutions, the parties 
and candidates are generally granted a certain amount of free time during 
election campaigns. This is the case in Australia,29 France,30 Germany,31 
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Great Britain,32 Israe1,83 Japan,34 Norway,85 and Turkey.36 In some of 
these countries, where the possibility exists to buy program time, 
parties and candidates are prohibited to ·buy additional time, as, e.g., 
in Great Britain37 and Japan. 38 In the United States with its system of 
commercial stations, the political parties and candidates have to buy 
broadcasting time. The sharply rising costs of this i tern in the party 
budgets39 have led to several proposals in order to improve the financial 
situation for parties and candidates. The alternatives are (1) that the 
government pays for the political broadcasts of the parties and candi-
dates, (2) that the stations provide free time for a certain amount of 
political broadcasts, and (S) that they sell political broadcast time at 
a reduced rate. At present the stations can charge for political broad-
casts as much as for other commercial programs but not more. 40 In ef-
fect it amounts to more, as political broadcast time is bought for the 
short campaign periods and does not benefit from the more favorable long 
tenn contracts,41 but the broadcasting industry has made available five-
minute periods for political programs at a special rate.42 The demand 
for free time is based on the argument that broadcasters benefit from 
the use of the "public airways" and therefore should pay the public back 
by granting free time for political broadcasts.43 Though it cannot be 
denied that the broadcasting stations should be charged for the particu-
lar position which is granted to them by the license, it is not quite 
understandable why they should pay their "tax" in the form of free time 
to political parties and candidates, i.e. to a specific group of people 
and not to the public in general (=the government). There are other 
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organizations working in the public interest, such as charitable groups 
or the government agencies themselves, which could claim the same right 
to free broadcasting time, if it were granted to political parties or 
candidates. On the other hand, there are services, such as railway and 
air transport or telecommunications which are similarly licensed and to 
which the same argument for free service could be applied. If these 
services are regulated on a commercial basis, the principle should be 
maintained in respect to everyone who wants to make use of them. The 
allocation of free time or any other free service is applicable only to 
those institutions which are run by the government or on a semi-public 
basis. The same principle is true in regard to the demand for reduced 
rates, because lesser rates are nothing but partially free time. 
The only proper way in a country with a commercial broadcasting 
system is to impose a license fee on the broadcasters as a compensation 
for the pennies ion to use the "public airways." Independently the govern-
ment can buy broadcasting time for the benefit of political parties and 
candidates. Plans for reimbursing political parties for radio and tele-
vision expenditures were introduced in several Congressional bills, such 
as S.227 (1961) by Senator Mansfield of Montana or S.1555 (1961) by 
Senator Maurine Neuberger of Oregon. The problem is different with 
regard to Educational Television (ETV) stations which are subsidized by 
government funds. From these stations reduced rates for political broad-
casts could and should be required,44 but many American states have 
banned political programs from ETV stations altogether.45 Only Wisconsin 
has a non-commercial radio network which is financed by the state and 
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provides free time for political broadcasts.46 The question of allocat-
ing a just time· to the various parties will be discussed later.47 
Conclusion 
Government assumption or support of specific political activities 
has the advantage that it can be limited to economically determinable 
48 amounts and subjected to a rather effective control. A danger, how-
ever, is that parties and candidates use the government aid only in 
addition to their ordinary expenditures and enlarge their propaganda 
activities further. This, in the end, would not serve the purpose of 
improving the situation of the side with the lesser financial means 
because the gap between the rich and the poor candidates and parties 
would remain. Parallel to the government subsidies, therefore, limita-
tions should be imposed, such as allowing no or only a certain maximum 
amount of additional broadcasting time, posters, pamphlets, newspaper 
advertisements, etc. The limited effect of the latter restrictions must 
be remembered, however.49 
General Financial Aid 
Subsidization of specific propaganda activities is of rather 
limited help to political parties. Their wide range of tasks for which 
they need large funds has made the parties try to get broader financial 
assistance from their governments in the form of payments without restric-
tions to certain purposes. Development has been slow so far and different 
in the various countries. 
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Tax Money 
One way to make government funds available for party purposes 
without special legislation has been the contribution of private money 
to political parties, part of which could be claimed as a tax deduction. 
With respect to this practice, plans and devices for and against tax 
benefits for political contributions have been developed. Supporters 
argue that the tax plans would (1) stimulate more and smaller contribu-
tions, because (a) part of the contribution could be claimed as a tax 
deduction and (b} the official government approval would make political 
contributions more respectable and comparable to charitable contribu-
tions, and (2) leave the decision as to the recipient of the partly 
public money to the individual citizen. Major argwnents against a tax 
benefit for political contributions are (1) that private groups, such as 
political parties, should not be given general government funds at all, 
(2) that the difficulties of administration and control are too great, 
and (3) that the system favors wealthy contributors. 
Tax deductible contributions were a major source of income for 
the German parties, especially the CDU/CSU and the FDP, for several 
years in the mid-1950 1 8 because the Sponsor Societies and the Civic 
Aasociations50 could claim a tax relief for donations to political 
51 parties. The Constitutional Court, however, declared the practice 
unconstitutional in two decisions. The first was brought to the Court 
bye party which was excluded from the benefit of tax deductible contri-
butions, because a legal provision for the application of the income tax 
law restricted such contributions to parties which were represented in a 
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parliament. The Constitutional Court declared the provision unconstitu-
tional as violating the principle of equal treatment laid down in 
Article 3 of the Basic Law. 52 Tax deductions for political contribu-
tions continued to be possible, if all parties benefited to an equal 
degree. In its second decision, however, the Constitutional Court de-
clared all tax deductions for political purposes void. The Court argued 
that it was true that the law treated all parties alike in a formal way 
and, the~efore, was in agreement with the letter of Art. 3 Basic Law; 
but that in its actual effects the law favored the parties with wealthy 
followers who paid higher taxes. As there was a considerable difference 
in this respect among the German parties--CDU/CSU and FDP with rich sup-
porters on the one hand, SPD with less well-to-do adherents on the other 
hand--the law discriminated against the Social Democrats who had called 
for the court action. As violating the equality clause in Art. 3 of 
the Basic Law, the Constitutional Court declared the provisions which 
permitted tax deductible contributions to political parties unconstitu-
tional.53 The practical result was that the income of the CDU/CSU and 
the FDP from contributions by the Sponsor Associations dropped from 70 
percent in 1958 to 20 and 28 percent in 1963~ 54 
In the United States, tax deductions for political purposes are 
possible only to a small extent. The Federal Code of Internal Revenue 
grants deductions for charitable but not for political contributions.55 
Only expenses incurred by corporations in impartial drives for registra-
tion, voting, and political contributions among their employees and the 
public are tax deductible, according to an authorization by the Internal 
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Revenue Service in 1962. 56 Until 1966, it had been a popular practice 
for many taxpayers to deduct as business expenses the costs of advertise-
ments in party publications and of tickets for fund-raising dinners and 
other party functions. 57 This practice was brought to an end by the 
"Tax Adjustment Act of 1966,"58 which in its third title prohibits a tax 
deduction for expenses for advertising and admission to events, if the 
proceeds benefit a political party or candidates. The deduction rate of 
48 percent had enabled corporations to charge the taxpayer for almost 
half of the costs for such contributions. The effect of the law will be 
noticed especially by state committees, many of which derived the larger 
part of their income from advertisements in their publications and from 
political dinners. 
Some states, such as Minnesota (1955), California (1957), 
Missouri (1961), and Hawaii (1968), have enacted provisions granting tax 
deductions for small political contributions up to $50 or $100, made in 
primary and/or general elections. In 1966, some nineteen states had 
income tax laws adjustable for such a regulation. 59 Since 1955, when 
the first of these laws was passed in Minnesota, a number of bills with 
siruilar proposals have been introduced in Congress. 60 The President's 
Commission in 1962 recommended a tax deduction up to $1,000 per year and 
a tax credit sys~em as alternatives for an experimental period over two 
pres_idential campaigns. 61 Following this recommendation, President 
Kennedy sent bills to Congress in 1962 and 1963.62 President Johnson in 
his "Election Reform Act 1966" dropped the proposal for a tax credit and 
suggested only a tax deduction up to $100.68 In the states, the provisions 
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on tax deductions for political contributions have existed for a rather 
short period and the benefits are not large because of the comparatively 
low state tax rates so that definite conclusions, especially in regard 
to a federal system, cannot be drawn from the state experience. 
Discussion of the tax plans has remained mostly theoretical. A 
tax deduction for political contributions would run parallel to the 
present system of tax deductions for charitable gifts, which would 
simplify adaptation for administration and public. On the other hand, 
the system benefits wealthy citizens due to the sliding scale of tax 
rates. Even if all citizens were restricted to a certain absolute 
amount, e.g. $100 per year, a contribution made by someone in a high 
tax bracket would contain a larger government subsidy than a contribu-
tion made by someone in a lower tax bracket, not to speak of those 
citizens who do not owe any tax at all. The device of the sliding tax 
rates, introduced for a balancing of the public financial burdens among 
citizens of different income, would have the reverse effect in the area 
of political contributions. 64 Such a result is incompatible with the 
fundamental "one man-one vote" principle of the democratic doctrine which 
requires basic equality of all citizens as to their political rights. 
Furthermore, it is doubtful whether a tax deduction would achieve its 
main purpose, the stimulation of a large number of small contributions. 
For the big contributors a deduction of $100 is of little importance, as 
they give more money anyway. People with low income, however, do not 
itemize their deductions in general, because the so-called standard 
deduction has more advantages for them. The savings which could be made 
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by deducting a political contribution of $10 or $20 would be so small 
that a change from the standard to an itemized deduction would not be 
profitable. To avoid the latter consequence, President Johnson's 
"Election Reform Act 1966" would allow the proposed deduction in addition 
to the standard deduction and not limited to those who itemize their 
deductions. 65 Nevertheless, the problem of unequal treatment as a result 
of the different tax brackets remains. 
·The same argument which speaks against a general tax deduction 
for political contributions can be brought forward against a special 
plan which would allow political candidates and officials to deduct 
certain personal costs, incurred in campaigns or office, as expenses, 
comparable to tax deductible costs in other professions. The underlying 
idea is that politics are to candidates what business is to other people. 
The federal law does not offer such a possibility.66 Minnesota allows 
certain candidates and party officials a deduction of.personal costs 
from their gross income up to a specified limit. 67 The main argument 
against this device is that it privileges the wealthy person. 
In order to prevent the unequal treatment of contributions which 
would be caused by a tax deduction system, and to stimulate small contri-
butions, suggestions have been made for a tax credit plan. 68 While the 
tax deduction is an allowance taken from the gross income before computa-
tion of the tax liability, the tax credit is taken from the liability 
itself so that every taxpayer is granted an equal benefit regardless of 
69 · the tax bracket. The result of an unmodified tax credit plan, however, 
is that the taxpayer does not bring any sacrifice out of his own pocket, 
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but only designates a political party or candidate as the recipient of a 
part of the tax he owes, up to the legal maximum. Therefore, most plans 
suggest a tax credit up to a maximum amount constituting only one-half 
of the total contribution; the other half must be paid by the contributor 
out of his own money. In general, the proposals would give a 50 percent 
tax credit up to a maximum of $10 a year.70 The advantage of such a 
credit over a tax deduction is that persons with a small income could 
benefit from it without itemizing their deductions; furthermore, the 
part paid by the government in form of the tax benefit would be a con-
stant amount for all contributors. People owing no tax or an amount 
less than the permitted maximum credit would nQt profit, however. About 
one-third of all persons over 18 years in the United States paid no 
federal tax in 1966, according to estimates;71 in Germany, the number 
is about the same, one-third of all eligible voters. 72 The annual revenue 
loss resulting from such a tax credit system was estimated at some $30 
million by the U. s. Treasury Department in 1961.73 While, on the whole, 
the credit scheme is preferable to the deduction plan, both have some 
difficulties in common for which no satisfactory solutions have been 
found yet. In 1965, only 33 states had an individual income tax.74 The 
tax benefit could be abused by a collusion between the contributor and 
the receiving party or candidate. The taxpayer would comply with the 
legal requirements, i.e. pay formally his own share in addition to the 
tax benefit but get his share refunded by the party or candidate, so 
that the political contribution would not cost him anything. Simple safe-
guards are not foolproof, while tighter controls are cumbersome and a 
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hindrance to mass solicitation, as the various receipt, stamp, apportion-
ment and postal money order plans show.75 The problem becomes more 
complicated if it is to be kept secret to whom the contribution is made. 
Furthermore, difficulties arise as to a just allocation of the funds 
among the prospective recipients. 76 
Another method which is designed to overcome the weaknesses of 
the deduction and credit systems is the tax assignment plan. The Presi-
dent's Commission77 in 1962 and Brink78 in 1968 suggested that each 
taxpayer should be authorized to assign one-half percent of his income 
tax liability to the political party of his choice. These proposals, 
however, like the deduction system, were incongruent with the principle 
of equal treatment because of the different amount of tax owed by the 
contributors. Some years earlier, in 1959, Shannon79 had publicized a 
plan according to which each taxpayer could designate one dollar of his 
income tax to the party of his choice; the money of those who did not 
choose a party was to go into a fund for impartial political education. 
This assignment idea is underlying the only tax plan which has been 
enacted into law by the U. s. Congress. In the last days of the 89th 
Congress, the "Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966"80 was 
passed as the result of S.3496, a bill introduced by Senator Russell B. 
Long, Democrat of Louisiana, on June 15, 1966.81 The Act, actually a 
"rider" on the Foreign Investors Tax Bill,82 authorizes every taxpayer, 
other than a non-resident alien, to designate one dollar of his federal 
income tax liability to be paid into the Presidential Election Campaign 
Fund (sec. 6096[a]). This can be done with respect to any taxable year 
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beginning after December 31, 1966 (sec. 6096[c]). Eligible for payments 
out of the Fund are political parties whose presidential candidate re-
ceived 15 million or more popular votes at the preceding election. Each 
of these parties is entitled to an equal share of a sum which is computed 
by multiplying the total presidential votes for these parties by $1 
but only insofar as the share surpasses $5 million (sec. 303[cl[2]). 
Parties whose presidential candidate received more than 5 million but 
less than 15 million popular votes at the preceding presidential election 
are entitled to the payment of a sum which is computed by multiplying the 
number of votes in excess of S million by $1 (~., [b]). Payments 
shall not be made before September l of the election year {ibid., [c]), 
and not in excess of the actual expenses incurred by the party (sec. 303 
[3]). The Comptroller General determines the number of votes received 
without being subject to review(~., (4)). An Advisory Board of two 
members representing each party receiving 15 million popular votes or 
more and three additional members, selected by the first two members, 
assists the Comptroller General (sec. 304). 
Discussion of the Long plan, which was enacted somewhat surpris-
ingly without formal hearings, except for a short debate in the Senate 
Finance Conunittee,83 has been vivid in Congress and among the interested 
public. In favor of the plan it has been said (1) that it assures the 
principle of "one man-one vote"; {2) that it diminishes the dependence 
of the parties on large contributions and special interests; (3) that it 
enlarges the base of party finance; (4) that parties will be better able 
to plan ahead because they can count on a steady income; (5) that the 
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plan will assure more accurate reporting as the parties have less reason 
to hide their financial sources; (6) that the method is less rigid than 
other government subsidies because it leaves the decision in the voterst 
hands; and (7) that the act of contributing will stimulate the political 
interest of the citizens in generai. 84 On the other hand, opponents of 
the plan point out (1) that it does not try to prevent t~e influence of 
outside assistance; (2) that it does not provide any help for other 
elective offices; (3) that it does not cover nomination campaigns; 
(4) that the minimum of S million popular votes in two elections dis-
criminates against small parties; (5) that the control of the funds 
given to the parties is insufficient; (6) that the reported expenses of 
both major parties together were about $30 million at the national level 
in 1964 but that these two parties will get approximately $30 million 
each for the 1968 presidential campaign; (7) that the limit of $3 million 
imposed on political committees by the Corrupt Practices Act is incom-
patible with such large subsidies; (8) that the power of the parties at 
the national level will increase tremendously and distort the traditional 
party structure; (9) that it is constitutionally questionable whether a 
private individual can be authorized to appropriate government funds; and 
(10) that the plan forces citizens, if they want to take advantage of it, 
to give to all the parties instead of to the party of their choice. 85 
It must be remembered that the Long plan, in order to be accept-
able at all, had to be the result of compromises, achieved by adapting 
it to demands from quite opposite directions. The Act is nothing less 
and nothing more than the first attempt of a large scale public 
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subsidization of parties and candidates at the federal level in the 
political history of the United States, a country with a long tradition 
of private financing. Viewed in this light, the statute is far-reaching, 
despite its weaknesses. Most of the arguments brought forward in favor 
of and against the tax assignment plan can be used for and against 
public support of political parties in general and will be discussed 
later. At this point only those problems will be considered which per-
tain directly to the tax assignment scheme. 
The control which is exercised by the citizens when they decide 
to assign their dollar to the Campaign Fund ("pro" arguments [6] and '[71) 
is a double-edged sword, because the annual tax assignment may have the 
effect of a popular referendum, which reflects a rather distorted picture 
as contributors and voters are not identical. Only those people can 
assign money who owe a net federal income tax of at least one dollar 
(sec. 6096(a]), but an estimated one-third of all Americans over 18 years 
do not pay any federal income tax. 86 As to the weaknesses of the plan, 
the question whether the appropriation of government funds by private 
individuals is constitutional ("con" argument [91) is not too serious,. 
according to government lawyers. 87 This problem was already presented in 
the second tax case before the German Constitutional Court. 88 According 
to the Long plan, the citizen is given the very limited possibility of 
deciding whether the fixed amount of one dollar of his tax liability is 
to go into the general tax fund of the government or into a special govem-
ment--not private--fund. The actual appropriation is made by a government 
agency, the Secretary of the Treasury (sec. 303[c][l]). The fact that the 
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taxpayer must assign his dollar to an all-party fund and, therefore, is 
forced to give to parties he may not want to support ("con" argument 
[10]) is defended as being a ttvoluntary contribution for good government" 
rather than a subsidization of a particular political group. 89 To offer 
the taxpayer a choice of designating a particular party would have com-
plicated the constitutional issue. Furthennore the equal treatment of 
the two major parties was probably the only way to get the consent from 
both sides. The just and proper distribution of the public funds belongs 
to the most difficult problems in the area of government aid to parties 
and candidates.90 
General Government~ 
The support of political parties and candidates from general 
government funds for other than specific propaganda purposes is a rela-
tively new form 9f political financing in Western democracies, though 
suggestions by influential persons have been made since the beginning of 
the century. 
Theodore Roosevelt91 was the first American president who, in 
1907, recommended ample appropriations of government funds to the great 
national parties for proper and legitimate expenses. After World War II, 
Presidents Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy, as well as presidential 
candidates Dewey, Stevenson, and Nixon supported similar ideas.92 The 
most fervent advocate in the U. s. Senate was the late Senator Richard L. 
Neuberger, Democrat of Oregon. In Weimar Germany, foreign minister 
Gustav Stresemann recommended a reimbursement of political parties for 
their election costs in order to make them independent of capitalistic 
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ideas and influence.93 Experiments, except for an unsuccessful attempt 
in Colorado in 1909/10, date back less than twenty years. Center of the 
development has been Latin America since the late 1940's, while large 
scale public subsidies are rare in other parts of the Western world. An 
exception was Germany for a short period between 1959 and 1966. 
A Colorado statute of 190994 provided for a public subsidization 
of political parties amounting to 25 cents per vote cast for the party's 
nominee· of governor at the preceding election. One-half of the money was 
to be given to the state committee of the party, the rest to the lower 
levels. Private contributions were prohibited, but the candidates could 
spend their own funds up to an amount equal to 40 percent of the annual 
salary of the office contested. In the following year, however, the law 
was declared unconstitutional by the Colorado Supreme Court. 95 A week 
later it was superseded by an election law and, in 1921, expressly 
repealed by the legislature.96 The law was not too promising, especially 
as it did not provide for help to new parties, for penalties in case of 
non-compliance, or for primary elections. Furthermore, 25 cents per vote 
were probably inadequate without additional funds from private contribu-
tions, and the number of votes in the previous election doubtful as a 
standard for detennining the amount of government aid to each party.97 
No other attempts have been mada in the United States at the federal or 
state levels, though bills were introduced; e.g. S.3242 by Senator 
Richard Neuberger of Oregon in 1956 suggesting a government subsidy of 15 
to 20 cents per vote, or S.1555 by Senator Maurine Neuberger of Oregon in 
1961, suggesting a 5 cent subsidy per vote. 
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Financial support to political parties in Latin America has been 
provided by statutes in Argentina, Uruguay, Costa Rica, and Mexico.98 
One of the most complete regulations was enacted by the Commonwealth of 
Puerto Rico in 1957. The "Election Fund Act"99 established an Election 
Fund in the Commonwealth Treasury from which each principal political 
party may draw a basic annual amount up to $75,000 in non-election years, 
and up to $150,000 in election years. Originally, the parties could 
defer unspent amounts from non-election years to the election year with-
out limit;100 a 1958 amendment restricted the amount which can be accumu-
lated for later years to 50 percent of the annual allotment in non-election 
years.101 During the first years under the new law, all three major 
parties spent more money than they were able to draw from the Election 
Fund. The Statehood Republican party relied on its rich supporters; the 
Popular Democratic party again solicited among government employees, thus 
violating at least the spirit of the law; the Independence party ran into 
serious financial difficulties.102 In a 1964 amendment, it was attempted 
to overcome the deficiencies by enlarging the government subsidies and by 
tightening the reporting requirements and the provisions prohibiting the 
solicitation of government employees.103 The additional funds are appro-
priated for the first time according to the parties' strength, while the 
original funds of $75,000 and $150,000 are still distributed equally to 
all principal parties.104 On the whole, the Puerto Rico experiment has 
shown that it is possible to enact a working system of government subsidies 
to political parties.105 
Without real precedence in either Germany itself or in other 
European countries, the Gennan parties started to appropriate government 
107 
funds for their activities in the late 1950 1s.106 The practice 
advanced so far that in 1965 the government payments out of federal and 
state funds covered some 60 percent of the expenditures of the major 
parties.107 In its decision of July 19, 1966,lOS the Constitutional 
Court set an end to the general subsidization of political parties by 
declaring unconstitutional the provision in the federal law which appro-
priated the money to the parties. 
· The financial situation, especially of the non-socialist parties, 
had deteriorated in the late 1950's after the second decision of the 
Constitutional Court on tax deductions for political contributions109 and 
the change of the Social Democrats away from nationalization plans in 
their Bad Godesberg program of 1959.110 The former heavy reliance on 
business money left the CDU/CSU and the FOP in a precarious financial 
situation when these sources dried up. The SPD was better off as it had 
its large membership, its commercial enterprises, the labor unions and 
the money refunded as compensation for its losses in the Hitler era.ill 
In the beginning it was, therefore, the bourgeois parties which pushed 
for a public subsidization, but the SPD accepted its share in order not 
to suffer a disadvantage, and later opposed only to the extent, not the 
principle, of the public party support.112 Besides the practical need 
for funds, the parties used a constitutional argument which they derived 
from the second tax decision of the Constitutional Court and in which 
the Court in a kind of obiter dictum113 had said that government aid 
for elections and also for the political parties which carried through 
such elections was permissible, since elections were a public duty and 
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the parties had a constitutionally decisive role in the discharge of 
this duty. This argument was mainly based on Art. 21 of the Basic Law 
according to which "the political parties participate in the forming of 
the political will of the people" (sec. 1, subsec. 1). Not only politi-
cians agreed, but also political scientists and government lawyers.114 
Besides the points pertaining to the particular situation in Germany, 
also more general arguments were brought forward. 
One of the most interesting aspects of the development in Germany, 
on the federal as well as on the lower levels of government, is the 
tremendous increase of the public support to the parties, once the ini-
tial obstacles had been removed. In 1959, the federal budget provided 
$1.25 million for the "support of the political education work of the 
parties." In 1962, the payments were increased to $5 million without 
restriction to political education work, and three years later, to $9.5 
million.115 This was an increase of 760 percent in six years.116 In 
five of the eleven states, a similar development of direct subsidization 
took place with amounts between some $40,000 in Lower Saxony and $1 mil-
lion in Northrhine-Westphalia in 1965.117 . In addition, the parties 
profited from sums which were appropriated to their parliamentary 
fractions (groups) and to their parliamentarians by the federal and all 
state governments, and from funds out of local budgets_.118 Direct sub-
sidies and sums given to parliamentary fractions by the federal and state 
governments totaled more than $8 million in 1962, more than $9 million in 
1963, and more than $14 million in 1965.119 The amount per eligible 
voter in 1965 was some 25 cents federal money and some 10 cents state 
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money.120 The money was distributed in different ways, e.g. twenty 
percent of the federal funds were divided equally among the parties in 
the Bundestag, the rest according to party strength,121 with the excep-
tion that all funds--federal, state and local--were restricted to parties 
which were represented in the respective parliaments.122 A most critical 
point was the control of the sums given away. Regulations provided for 
some check, often by the president of the court of account, but their 
practical effect was that the public remained uninfonned of eventual 
irregularities, though the parties tried to avoid scandals.123 
The Constitutional Court based its decision of July 19, 1966, on 
a fundamental interpretation of the essential nature of political parties 
in the modem federal party state.124 The Court distinguished between 
the two spheres of the private citizen with his organizations and of the 
government with its official agencies. The political parties, as other 
groups formed by citizens to fnfluence public opinion, belong to the 
private sphere in which it must be guaranteed that opinions are formed 
in a free, open, and unregulated way.125 Parties are not quasi-govern-
ment organizations. The govemment can, however, intervene in the 
democratic process of the free formation of public opinion and public 
will, but only when justified by a constitutionally legitimate reason.126 
For an interference with this process by government subsidization of 
political parties, which would interconnect the parties with the official 
sphere of government agencies and deliver them to government welfare, no 
special and constitutionally justified reason was evident.127 The Court 
took back its farther reaching opinion expressed in the obiter dictum of 
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of the second tax decision.128 One exception permitted by the court--
the reimbursement of election costs--will be dis~ussed later.129 
Arpents for!!!.!!_ against Public Subsidies 
Despite little experience with public subsidies in most countries, 
discussion about the question whether political parties should receive 
payments out of government funds has been vivid. Political financing is 
crucial. in a democratic country because politics cost money. Modem 
diversified society must be informed and educated continuously and cam-
paigning is expensive. Membership and the number of small contributors 
are insignificant, dependence on large givers is considered as a danger, 
and even this source is often insufficient. Public subsidies are seen 
as the only possibility to escape the difficulties. On the other hand, 
a dependence on the state is regarded as even a greater evil. As the way 
in which parties and candidates collect and spend their funds has an 
impact on policy maker~ and their wide range of activities, arguments for 
and against public subsidies comprise not only their influence on parties 
and candidates but also on voters and the whole government structure as 
well. 
Parties and Candidates -
The difficulties which the parties encounter in financing their 
activities from private sources, their reliance on a few and sometimes 
even disrespectful contributors, the irregular flow of those funds, and 
the inequality in regard to financial means among the parties have con-
vinced many observers that a public subsidization of parties and 
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candidates would bring more stability and justice into the political 
process. In a democracy no citizen can be forced to become a contribut-
ing member of a political party, large contributors may expect rewards, 
and the financial power of a party does not necessarily reflect the size 
of its popular support, if it has its followers among the poor. Differ-
ences among candidates in character and ideas are natural, but differences 
in money is thought to be an undemocratic element in politics.180 The 
advocates of public subsidies maintain that government funds will create 
an opportunity for a more equal start of parties and candidates as far 
as their financial means are concerned. 
As an argument against government subventions, it is brought 
forward that political parties are private associations; but there are 
other private activities, such as sciences, arts, or agriculture, which 
are publicly subsidized. On the other hand, it is said that political 
parties perform public functions and therefore should be paid from public 
funds. This opinion prevailed in Germany nourished by Art. 21 of the 
Basic Law and its interpretation by the Constitutional Court in its 
second tax decision. In its 1966 decision the Court, however, clari-
fied that Art. 21 cannot be interpreted as giving the political parties 
a right to government subsidies.181 The parties are associations formed 
by private individuals and groups and competing for the power in the 
state. They do not exercise public authority and are not part of the 
government apparatus, even when they take part in public activities, 
especially in elections.182 Political parties are important in the 
formulation of public opinion and public will, but they are not the only 
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private groups trying to influence this process. A one-sided and strong 
support of political parties by government funds would distort the dis-
tribution of potential influence among these diverse groups in modern 
pluralistic society. Some stability is necessary for the performance 
of party work and it depends on a regular income. Financial insurance 
in the form of extensive public aid, however, is opposed to the dynamic 
nature of political parties which includes the risk of failure. 133 This 
does not completely exclude public subsidies, but the center of the 
financial resources of political parties must be in the private sector.134 
An argument closely connected is that the parties, if they are 
certain to receive their income from the government, become apathetic in 
their efforts of recruiting new members and enlarging the number of 
small contributors.185 On the other hand, potential contributors do 
not feel that the parties need private help and become unwilling to sup-
port them.136 A vicious circle is initiated which leads to larger public 
aid and to smaller private support. Tax plans are thought to show a way 
for government funds without the consequence of party and contributor 
apathy, because they allow and make necessary private initiative and 
party efforts. 
A public subsidization effects the power structure within the 
parties. In many parties which depend on private contributions, especi-
ally in the two major American parties and the Social Democratic party 
of Germany, the money flows upward from the lower levels to the national 
organization. This is achieved either by imposing quotas, i.e. shares 
assigned to the lower levels, or by demanding a certain percentage of 
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income of the lower levels.137 It is not disputed that the public sup-
port will inverse the flow of money within the parties and lead to a 
power concentration at the higher party level when the money is given 
to the national organization and distributed by it. An alternative is 
that the government payments are simultaneously made to the national, 
state, and local levels of the party organizations.138 Different 
opinions are held as to the desirability of such a concentration effect, 
however. Those in favor of the concentration maintain that it will 
enhance party discipline and enable the parties to pursue a straightfor-
ward and responsible line of policy. This argwnent is voiced especially 
in the United States where it is often regretted that politics are 
centered around candidates rather than parties and that parties frequently 
resemble temporary coalitions of diverse interests, rather than coherent 
political groups. Candidates often have their own private fund-raising 
committees originating in their nomination campaigns, and the Hatch Act 
with its insufficient ceilings on contributions and expenditures in 
regard to political committees has greatly influenced the tendency of 
decentralizing political financing.139 Opponents of such a concentration 
point out that it leads to a bureaucratization of the parties and to 
their isolation from members and voters. Candidates will become danger-
ously dependent on the good will of the party managers, as can already be 
seen in Great Britain where, without the help of public subsidies, the 
prime minister can threaten uncooperative Members of Parliament with a 
dissolution of the House and the determination of new elections which 
many candidates cannot afford without the party's financial support. 
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One of the most difficult problems of public finance of politi-
cal parties is the just distribution of the funds among the potential 
recipients. A way must be found that allows defining which political 
group is eligible to receive a share out of the public funds distributed 
to "political parties." Loose requirements favor the creation of 
splinter groups; strict requirements discriminate against small parties. 
To find the golden middle is a matter of viewpoint and practical experi-
ence. Those approving a two-party system set a high minimum which a 
political party has to reach before it qualifies for public aid; those 
who prefer a more diversified party picture are more lenient. Most 
practical attempts require a rather high number of popular votes, regis-
tered voters, or petitions. In France, reimbursement of political costs 
are made to those candidates who get more than five percent of the votes 
cast.140 In Japan, each candidate is eligible for the aid provided by 
governrnent.141 To become a candidate is not difficult: the applicant 
must be a native-born Japanese of at least 25 years of age, file simple 
election papers, and deposit about $280 (100,000 yen) which is refunded 
if he gets one-fifth of the average vote per elective office cast in his 
district.142 In Great Britain, a nomination is not valid unless a sum of 
iJ.00 is deposited for the candidate; the amount is forfeited if the 
candidate does not poll more than one-eighth of the total vote for all 
candidatea.143 Payments out of the election fund in Puerto Rico are made 
to the "principal" political parties, i.e. duly registered parties which 
received at least ten percent of the vote for governor in the preceding 
general elections.144 Furthermore, the funds are restricted to those 
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principal parties which "have participated in a general election in all 
election precincts of Puerto Rico and as a result of which preserved 
their status of principal parties and gained representation in the Legis-
lature.ul4S The minimum limits laid down in the Presidential Election 
Campaign Fund Act of 1966 are high and must be seen in the light of the 
American preference for the two-party system. Third parties have to get 
five million popular votes in two consecutive presidential elections and 
are eligible for funds only as a result of votes above the five million 
minimum.146 Critics regard this minimum requirement, which was raised by 
a Conference Committee from 1.5 million votes in the original bill,147 as 
discriminating against minor parties,148 and Senator Long of Louisiana 
suggested an amendment which would let the minor parties share the Fund 
already in the first election in which they receive more than five million 
votes.149 In Germany, only those parties represented in the parliaments 
received public subsidies.150 According to the Federal Election Code of 
1956--state statutes are similar--this meant that a party had to get at 
least five percent of all list votes or three candidates elected by a 
simple majority in three of the 259 single-member constituencies (sec. 6, 
subsec.:14}. In its 1966 decision, the Constitutional Court stated that 
this limit was too high as a minimum qualification for government aid 
because, if applied twice (in elections and for financing) the effect of 
.the so-called five-percent provision would be doubled and minor parties 
practically banned from Parliament.151 Suggestions in the United States 
call for a high minimum. Paul Douglas,152 in 1954, demanded at least ten 
percent of the total vote; as did Senator Richard Neuberger's bill, 
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153 S.3242 in 1956. The President's Commission and most bills in the 89th 
Congress wanted to restrict public subsidies to parties whose candidate 
for president or vice-president was at least on ten state ballots.154 
Rose•s155 plan to pay the candidates instead of the parties would avoid 
the difficulty of defining which groups are eligible but would not solve 
the problem of which candidates qualify for government aid'. Besides, the 
system would be difficult to apply in countries with proportional repre-
sentation. 
Closely connected with the question of how to define the recip-
ients of the public subsidies is the problem of finding a just standard 
according to which the funds are distributed among the potential recip-
ients. The choice is between equal shares to all eligible groups, 
proportionate shares according to their strength, or a combination of the 
two principles. Essentially, it is a problem of equal treatment, which 
means that the government must treat equal things, and only equal things, 
equal. The question is whether all parties are equal because they seek 
representation in government or unequal because they have different sup-
port in the population. Democratic theory requires that the citizen 
decides upon the distribution of government power for which the differ-
ent political groups compete in a continuous struggle. From time to time 
the ever-changing power distribution is fixed by an election; but it must 
be assured that the outcome reflects the power distribution in the popula-
tion at that time. The difference of party strength, which is created by 
the popular process, is essential for the democratic government structure, 
and must not be covered up or distorted by government interference. 
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Public subsidies are not to make political parties equal in strength, 
but to give political parties an opportunity to become equai.156 _Govern-
ment aid given equally to all (eligible) parties regardless of their 
support in the population, therefore, violates the principle of equal 
treatment, as it discriminates against the larger parties. It cannot 
be denied, however, that sometimes, especially when the major parties 
are of almost equal strength, it is the only way of getting a statute 
enacted, as was probably the case with the American Presidential Election 
Fund Act of 1966. In Puerto Rico, the principle of equal shares, intro-
duced by the 1957 law, was substituted for a mixed system by the 1964 
amendment.157 A combination method also existed on the federal level 
in Germany.158 As far as equal shares in these combination plans are 
concerned, the same objections can be raised against them as against 
the equal distribution method in general. 
Plans to distribute the funds according to party strength met 
with the difficulty of finding a device of measuring party strength. 
The nwnber of votes cast in the previous election is considered as not 
flexible enough.159 Nevertheless, most enacted regulations applied this 
method, such as the Colorado statute of 1909,160 the American Presiden-
tial Election Ca~paign Fund Act of 1966,161 and also the all-partisan 
experiment in Alexandria.162 The German regulation had the further 
disadvantage that a fixed amount of money, determined by the legislature, 
was distributed to the parties represented in the parliament. Shifts 
took place only in the amounts assigned to each parliamentary fraction, 
but not in the absolute sum according to the voter participation in the 
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elections.163 To base the payments on the votes cast in the current 
election is preferable. It is done with the reimbursements to candi-
dates in France,164 but involves greatest administrative problems if 
applied to large scale public subsidies. The parties would need the 
money during the campaign rather than after election day, and advance 
payments would be necessary, but difficult to estimate, especially for 
new parties and after a considerable change in policies. The number of 
party members as a base is an uncertain standard, since it is difficult 
to distinguish between genuine and false members. An artificial increase 
in membership was tried by groups who qualified for grants under the 
Federal Youth Plan in Germany.165 Furthermore, non-membership parties 
would be at a disadvantage. 
An ideal method of distributing government funds cannot be found; 
some deny that there exists any just way.166 Practical experience with 
the distribution of government aid has been made in the area of broad-
casting in many countries, but this does not reveal the golden rule 
either. Italy,167 Japan,168 and Norway169 give equal time to all parties. 
In Norway, parties are assigned twenty minutes each on consecutive nights 
during election campaigns; in addition, all parties join in a two-and-one-
half hour discussion program.170 . Parties in Turkey are eligible for a 
maximum broadcasting time of ten minutes daily if they nominate candidates 
in at least five constituencies, and of up to twenty minutes if they 
nominate candidates in at least twenty constituencies.171 In France, 
special decrees permit "national" parties, i.e. parties which nominate 
more than 75 candidates in parliamentary elections, to use the state-owned 
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broadcasting stations for two programs of five to ten minutes each, one 
over radio, the other over television.172 Time in Great Britain is 
divided according to party strength, e.g. television time was given to 
the three major parties in a ratio of 95:95:25 in 1959.178 In Israel, 
parties receive broadcasting time according to their strength in the 
outgoing Knesset.174 The Constitutional Court of Germany has decided 
that no party may completely be excluded from the benefit of broadcast-
ing time, if it takes part in elections within the range of the station, 
but that a differentiation according to party strength is permissible.175 
The stations assign the time mainly on the basis of the preceding elec-
tions.176 This was also recommended in the draft of the party law of 
1959.177 In the United States, where broadcasting stations are mostly 
in private bands, the law obliges broadcasters only to give legally 
qualified candidates equal opportunities to opposing candidates, but 
broadcasters may choose to give no time to any candidate.178 This leads 
to the unfortunate situation that even major party candidates are not 
offered free time, though the stations would like to present them to the 
public, because minor party candidates must be given equal time despite 
little interest for them among the audience. Commercial broadcasters 
cannot afford, however, unattractive programs; for presidential and 
vice-presidential candidates, section 315(a) of the Federal Communica-
tions Act, therefore, was suspended by federal law179 for the 1960 cam-
paign so that special programs could be run only for the two major party 
candidates. This practice was not repeated, however, though it was 
recommended by the President's Commission and others.180 
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The Constitutional Court of Germany, in order to overcome the 
difficulties in finding a just standard of distribution, decided not to 
recommend one single criterion as a basis for the assignment of broad-
casting time, but to suggest the combin~tion of a nwnber of factors. 
This method is not easily applicable, but gives a better starting point 
for further theoretical evaluation, and the final elaboration of a work-
ing formula. In detail, the criteria suggested by the Court are the 
previous election result, the party's length of existence, the size of 
its membership and organization, its representation in parliament, and 
its participation in the executive branch of goverrunent.181 
Advocates of tax plans point out that their device bypasses the 
intricate problem of allocating the funds, because the total sum to be 
distributed and the shares given to the particular parties are determined 
by the individual taxpayers.182 
Financing their nomination campaigns is for many American candi-
dates more difficult than to obtain funds for the general election race. 
While for the general election campaign the candidate can expect some 
help from his party, the organization rarely assists candidates in their 
efforts for nomination, because it does not want to disappoint any 
potential contributors to its general election fund by taking sides in 
the inner-party struggle for nomination.183 The Presidential Election 
Campaign Fund Act of 1966 was criticized for not covering preconvention 
costs, but supporters pointed out that the tax funds would set free money 
for contributions to nomination carnpaigns.184 They also regarded the Act 
as a mere beginning, and Senator Long of Louisiana later suggested a 
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government subsidy of 50 cents per vote to the winning candidate in the 
presidential preference primary.185 This, however, would discriminate 
against minor party candidates; a better suggestion is to reimburse all 
candidates who poll a certain minimum percentage in the primaries.186 
The situation of the primary candidate is further endangered by 
the incomplete regulation of the nominating process in the corrupt 
practices acts. An amendment to the first national publicity law of 
1910 passed in 'the following year187 extended the original law to cover 
the expenditures of U. s. Representatives and Senators in their nomina-
tion campaigns. In 1921, the u. s. Supreme Court188 invalidated the 
publicity law as far as it regulated the primary elections of Senators, 
without making it clear whether primaries in general were to be regarded 
as substantially different from general elections and thus not subject 
to the same rules.189 After the Court, in 1935,190 had declared that 
primaries were private party affairs, it began to change this opinion 
in 1941.191 Finally, in 1944, the Court192 reversed its 1935 decision 
and ruled that parties and general elections were a single instrumentality 
for the choice of officers. Though it is doubtful whether Congress was 
ever barred from passing primary legislation by the Supreme Court's 
opinion (maybe with the exception of a few years after the 1935 case), 
corrupt practices laws cover only general elections.193 This leaves a 
large loophole, especially in the so-called one-party constituencies 
where elections are decided in the primary race. One exception, however, 
exists: activities of national banks, corporations, and labor unions in 
regard to political financing are covered in primary as well as in 
122 
general elections.194 Most Congressional bills include nominations into 
corrupt practices legislation, e.g. President Johnson's Election Reform 
Act 1966,195 but not S.2541, the bill which received a Senate committee 
hearing in 1966.196 In summary, it can be said that any regulation of 
political financing in the general elections must include the nominating 
process. 
Voters. 
Opponents of public subsidies to political parties are afraid 
that the interest of the population in donating to parties and candi-
dates will further decline with the introduction and growth of govern-
ment funds, as contributors will think that parties do not really need 
their money. This happened in Germany where government subsidies in-
197 creased by some 760 percent between 1959 and 1965 and contributions 
from the industry to non-socialist parties sank to about one-third in 
1963 from the 1959 levei.198 Such a development is the more regrettable 
as contributors are often more involved in other forms of political 
activities than non-contributing individuals.199 The tax plans, includ-
ing the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966, avoid this 
difficulty by giving the public a decisive role in the distribution of 
the public subsidies.200 Another disadvantage of subventions out of 
general government funds is that each citizen is practically forced to 
contribute to parties or candidates who are not his choice, and be may 
favor political groups which are not eligible for the funds.201 The 
answer to this argument is a just system of distribution whose difficul-
202 ties have already been discussed. The problem can be avoided by the 
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tax deduction or credit plans, but was not solved by the Presidential 
Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966.203 On the other hand, the supporters 
of public subsidies point out that the payment of money to parties and 
candidates, either out of general government funds or in the form of a 
tax assignment plan with a low and fixed amount, grant every citizen 
an equal voice in the matter of political finance. 204 This is, however, 
not quite true for the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966 
as a minimum income tax liability of $1 is requirea.205 
Government Structure 
In countries with a federal government structure, like Germany 
or the United States, a further difficulty arises from the different 
legislative competence on the national and state levels. The 1966 
decision of the German Constitutional Court206 voided only the federal 
law which provided public subsidies for the political parties, not eimi~ 
lar provisions in the states. Menzel draws the conclusion that the 
states cannot continue with their practices, because the decision of the 
Constitutional Court is founded on the general nature of political par-
ties in relation to a constitutional government; furthermore, that the 
so-called homogeneity provision of Art. 28 Basic Law as well as the 
need for an effective enforcement of a federal regulation oblige the 
states to a similar legislation.207 
The effects of different requirements in federal and state laws 
can be observed from the corrupt practices acts in the United States. 
The rule still is that Congress has no general power over state and 
local elections, though various exceptions exist, e.g. in 18 u. s. Code 
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607, 608, 612; 15 U. s. Code 79(l)(h); 1964. This opinion is reflected 
in several decisions of the u. s. Supreme Court.208 Especially unfortun-
ate and responsible for the little success of the laws is that state and 
local political committees are not covered by the reporting requirements, 
even when they support federal candidates.209 Lobel210 suggested that 
it probably was not so much the protection of state rights which caused 
this exception as the desire to leave the finances of local committees, 
the main supporters of Congressmen, undisclosed. Observers agree that 
no efficient regulation can be achieved without covering all financial 
sources of federal candidates. President Johnson's Election Reform Act 
1966 supported an extension of reporting requirements,211 but S.2541, 
the bill considered in a Senate committee, did not.212 As to public 
subsidies, it has been suggested that the states introduce plans paral-
lel to federal provisions in order to avoid a vertical division of the 
party system into a rich federal and poor state and local branches.213 
Otherwise, as was noticed by Menzel for Germany, the system would not 
work effectively and evasions of the law would be inevitable. An exten-
sion of the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966 to the state 
level was recommended in the Congressional debates,214 though this would 
involve some difficulties as only 33 states had individual income tax 
laws in 1965.215 
A further problem, inherent in every democratic government, is 
the danger which arises from the rule of the majority. The way of distri-
buting the funds is determined by the party or parties in power which can 
manipulate the flow of money in such a direction that the parties out of 
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power are put at a disadvantage. If these parties are dependent on the 
government subsidies, their situation becomes precarious. The practice 
in Germany where only parties represented in the parliaments were 
eligible as recipients, or the American Presidential Election Campaign 
Fund Act of 1966 with its high minimum requirements217 serve as examples. 
In 1962, the German FDP was "punished" for dissenting with its larger 
coalition partner, the CDU/CSU, by a change of the distribution mode. 218 
Incumbents in the United States are frequently opposed to a 
change of the present statutes. They have the advantage of indirect 
government aid, such as office staff, free air travel, franking and 
telecommunication privileges.219 Direct public subsidies would give 
them additional help, but the disadvantage involved is thought to be 
greater. Many potential rivals, nowadays, shrink back from challenging 
incumbents who are well known and backed by their official position. The 
costs of "building up" a new man are tremendous and to raise private 
funds is difficult for a newcomer. Direct public subsidies would assure 
at least one strong opponent in every election race, even for those 
incumbents who have rarely been challenged so far. 220 
Advantages from its official connections are also drawn by the 
party in power. In Italy, the state-owned newspapers and broadcasting 
stations favor the government parties.221 The situation is better in 
countries with a federal structure where different parties hold the major-
ity at the federal and state levels, e.g. in Germany. Another source of 
aid to the party in power are the, often secret, funds appropriated to 
government agencies for official government propaganda, which in practice 
is hardly distinguishable from party propaganda.222 
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Control of Funds --
After discussing the arguments brought forward in favor of and 
against public subsidies, some remarks must be added about their proper 
control and safeguards. Adequate devices are necessary so that the funds 
are used only for the intended purposes. First of all, an absolute maxi-
mum amount of money for political subventions could be fixed in the gov-
ernment budget in order to assure their adjustment to other government 
expenditures. The protection granted by this safeguard is questionable, 
however, as can be seen from the experience in Germany223 and Puerto 
Rico. 224 What the government can afford and what the parties need can-
not exactly be determined and remains a matter of arbitrary discretion. 
"L'app~tit vient en mangeant" seems to be a favorable principle.225 
Another possibility to prevent the abuse of government funds is 
to restrict them for certain purposes. This device seems to work, if 
the purposes are defined in detail, e.g. in France, Israel or Turkey.226 
In Germany, the government funds had initially been designated for the 
"political education work" of the parties;227 but this restriction was 
dropped a few years later because the parties needed the funds for their 
general party work. 228 The limitation to political education work had 
frequently been criticized as a misleading label. 229 The 1965 SPD draft 
of a party law, which did not recommend general party subventions, pro-
vided for government aid to political parties for "civic education.11230 
As has been done in the United States,231 the Constitutional Court and 
experts in Germany pointed out that no valid distinction can be made 
between the political and educational work of parties. In order to 
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prevent an evasion of the prohibition of general public subsidies, the 
Constitutional Court also declared unconstitutional government funds for 
the "political education work" of the parties.232 
Prevention of abuse, furthermore, requires proper administration 
of the funds. The Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966 puts 
the control into the hands of the Comptroller General and an Advisory 
Board of party representatives.283 The law has been criticized for not 
· 284 providing adequate means of control, and it is questionable if the 
authorities will perform their tasks adequately without legal guidelines. 
It remains to be seen how the control system will work in practice. The 
inadequate control of the funds in Germany has already been pointed out.235 
Lobe1236 suggested tightening the American Act of 1966 by having the 
Comptroller General pay the parties' bills directly to the seller upon 
certification instead of giving the money to the parties. Experience in 
Puerto Rico shows that the device works well there. 237 
If public subsidies are to serve not only as an additional source 
of income for the parties, but also as a means of reforming the present 
methods of party financing, some regulations must be enacted about pri-
vate contributions. Though a complete prohibition would seriously 
affect the big givers, several reasons speak against such a radical pro-
ceeding. Practical experience shows the impossibility of outlawing all 
contributions without a tremendous display of control which is adverse 
to the free political process; the constitutional justification is 
doubtful in regard to the right of free opinion and expression; desirable 
initiative of private individuals to take part in political activities 
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would be diminished; and to defray all party expenditures could be too 
heavy a burden on the government budget. The Colorado law of 1909 did 
prohibit all private contributiona;238 the German parties were only con-
cerned about an additional source of income which they saw in public 
subsidies;239 the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act of 1966 does 
not regulate outside contributions for which it was criticized,240 but 
provisions were planned for a later date.241 The Puerto Rico law for-
bids all direct and indirect private contributions above $400 a year and 
above $600 in an election year.242 Similar restrictions have been recom-
mended by political experts in the United States.243 
Compromises 
Matching Incentives 
One of the strongest objections to direct public subsidies is 
caused by the fear that political organizations would lose their inter-
est in soliciting and private contributors their interest in giving. 
Though the present situation of private party finance is unsatisfactory,244 
direct government subsidies would not improve this way of political finan-
cing, which is the most suitable and desirable under a democratic govern-
ment. Tax plans offer an incentive for party and individual initiative, 
but have the disadvantage of not treating all citizens as equal, either 
because of the tax rate {deduction plan) or because of the large number 
of voters who do not owe a net tax. Furthermore, the yearly tax payment 
would resemble a popular referendum incompatible with the principle of 
245 elections at a fixed interval. As a superior device "matching 
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incentive" plans have been suggested which make the payment of public 
subsidies dependent on the amount of private donations the political 
parties are able to raise. This device was reconmended by the Presi-
246 dent's Commission in 1962 as a possibility of supporting political 
parties, if improvement of private financing were not sufficient. 
According to the plan, political conanittees raise private contributions 
of small amounts, up to about $10 per person per year. The committee 
deposits the money raised with the u. s. Treasury where the money is 
matched by a like sum from appropriations. This combined total is 
available to the committee for authorized types of expenditures. Pay-
ments are made by government checks directly to the sellers of goods and 
services; no cash is given to the committee.247 This plan has been sup-
ported by President Kennedy and by political scientists, among them 
Herbert Alexander.248 
In Germany, where government subventions generally are given 
according to the principle that considerable amounts have to be contri-
buted from the recipients' own funds, the statutes providing for public 
subsidies to the political parties have never imposed such a stipulation 
upon the latter.249 The draft of a party law of 1964 by the CDU/CSU and 
FDP, however, introduced a kind of "matching incentive" device in sec-
tions 23 and 24.250 Besides the distribution of direct subsidies to the 
parties represented in the parliaments (sec. 20-22), all parties which 
received at least o.5 percent of all list votes or won at least one 
constituency by simple majority would be eligible for funds by the "match-
ing incentive" plan. The federal government would issue contribution 
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bonds (Spendengutscheine) to eligible parties according to the number of 
list votes received at the preceding election. They could sell the bonds 
at face value to supporters who in turn could redeem the bonds at 40 per-
cent of their face value from the government. The total redeemable 
value of all bonds would be fixed at 20 cents multiplied by the number 
of eligible voters. The plan has several serious weaknesses. The redemp-
tion of a certain percentage of a donation discriminates against contribu-
tors of small sums, though not quite as much as tax deductions where the 
effect is increased by the sliding tax scale. The existing inequality 
of donors is supported by the govemment refund and parties with big 
givers are better off.251 A fair system could be achieved if the abso-
lute amount of each contribution were fixed at a sum which could easily 
be afforded by all citizens, as was suggested by the President's Commis-
sion. The limitation of the total value of the funds in the CDU/CSU-FDP 
plan, however, may lead to further injustice when all bonds are sold so 
that some contributors could not make use of the 40 percent redemption.252 
A total limit of the matching sum in the plan of t~e President's Commis-
sion, if fixed equally upon all committees, could not violate the 
principle of equal treatment. Each committee would be eligible for the 
same support, while it would not make a difference to an individual con-
tributor whether his donation was matched or not, as he would pay an 
absolute amount up to the small maximwn limit. The plan of the President's 
Commission also has the advantage of a better control over the funds, 
because the parties would not get the cash but only the right to arrange 
payments for authorized costs from their deposits. The CDU/CSU-FDP plan 
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is not only open to misuse by the parties when they spend the money, but 
also enables collusion between party and contributor at government cost; 
the party could sell the bond at a lower price than the face value to 
253 the supporter. 
Campaign!!!!!, Regular Expenditures 
Another plan which combines private party funds and government 
subsidies was suggested in the 1966 decision of the German Constitutional 
Court. Though the Court declared unconstitutional a general party sup-
port from government funds,254 it said that it was admissible to refund 
the parties for the "necessary costs of a reasonable election campaign."255 
This exception has been attacked as being inconsistent with the reasons 
256 given for the prohibition of government funds for general party work, 
because all party activities, regular year round as well as campaign work, 
are directed toward the same goal. 257 Supporters of the Court's decision 
differentiate between the parties in their year round work as "mouth-
piece" of the people or 0 pre-formers" of the political will and the 
parties in election campaigns as instruments for forming the highest 
258 offices of government, in the legislative assembly. The first opinion 
seems to be more appropriate in regard to the role of political parties 
in the modem party state where parties and officials are in a continu-
ous state of campaigning.259 This can be observed in countries where 
laws try to distinguish between "regular" and "election" activities. 
Under the present form of legislation the problem mainly arises i~ connec-
tion with statutes requiring the limitation of political expenditures of 
the reporting of political finances. In Japan, "election" but not 
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"regular" political expenditures are limited by law; the distinction is 
considered unrealistic.260 The Bfitish law requires candidates to 
report during election campaigns but does not define when the campaign 
2fil · begins. The courts have decided particular cases without giving 
general guidelines.262 In practice, a candidate does not report before 
· 268 he has expressly asked to vote for him. 
To regard political parties as an entity with the same charac-
teristics in regular and campaign activities.does not mean that the 
compromise suggested by the German Constitutional Court must be rejected. 
If political parties are considered as private organizations which must 
support themselves from their own private sources, there is no reason 
why they should not receive government aid in exceptional situations. 
Parties are important in modern democratic government at all times, but 
they are indispensable during election periods. The Constitutional 
Court correctly stated that the government is not obligated to take the 
I 
risk of failure from the parties. On the other hand, experience has 
shown that no modern party can live on private sources alone, at least 
264 under present legislation. Though public opinion and public will in 
a pluralistic society are fonned by the parties and by other private 
groups, it must be taken into consideration that the other groups are 
often financed in a way which is not recomendable for political parties, 
viz. by a few wealthy individuals or groups of a single interest. Parties 
must not only be competitive among each other but against outside groups 
as well. A restriction of propaganda, therefore, is advisable only to a 
certain degree in order not to create a dangerous vacuum which would be 
filled by less desirable elements. 
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This means that public aid to political parties is justified as 
long as the parties are not able to raise sufficient means from private 
sources. Government subsidies to political parties, like subventions to 
other private groups, must be of a temporary nature, helping the parties 
to develop a sound basis of private support. So far the attempts of the 
parties have not proven that sufficient private money cannot be raised 
if efforts were increased.265 Such a transitional help seems to be 
justified in Germany where the parties, after the obiter dictum of the 
Constitutional Court in its second tax decision, had some right to be 
confident about receiving government money permanently.266 The best way 
to plan the transitional period would be a matching incentive device in 
which the share borne by the government would be fairly large in the 
beginning but gradually reduced in favor of a larger private portion, 
until the government aid would be dropped. The German parties after the 
1966 decision of the Constitutional Court, however, have pleaded for a 
permanent and guaranteed minimum income for their election campaigns 
without dependence on private efforts. Suggestions are made to distri-
bute about 60 cents multiplied by the number of eligible voters over a 
four-year period among the parties at the national level which received 
at least 2.5 percent of all list votes;267 Plate had recommended one 
268 · percent. The total sum within a four-year period would amount to some 
$24 million ae compared to $38 million under the voided federal law of 
1965.269 The states are inclined to refund some 40 cents per valid vote 
cast. 270 Suggestions have also been made to amend the Basic Law in order 
to enable a general party financing from govemment funds after au.271 
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Whether such an amendment would be constitutional remains doubtful, as 
the Constitutional Court did not base its decision on a particular 
article of the Basic Law but on the general nature and position of the 
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CONCLUSION 
Regular Party 
Private financing of the major political parties in Western demo-
cratic countries is insufficient or in an unsatisfactory state. Costs of 
campaigning and of regular party activities are high and continue to rise 
due to extended suffrage and new propaganda techniques. The parties have 
not developed adequate and sound methods of financing their activities. 
Instead of broadening their financial base by winning larger numbers of 
members and small contributors, they rely on the more convenient source 
of money from a few wealthy givers, mainly connected with business and 
labor. The neglect of careful research regarding the most effective 
techniques of propaganda has led to waste of campaign funds. Efforts of 
the American Republican party, such as direct mail pleas and mass solici-
tation by press and broadcasting appeals, have shown that a large number 
of small contributions can be raised. The ultimate object of the politi-
cal parties must be the broadening of their financial base by encouraging 
larger parts of the population to give to party funds. So far, the 
parties have not proven that this goal cannot be reached, if efforts are 
persistent and ingenious enough. Promising plans, such as the one sug-
gested by Kilpatrick, must still be evaluated. 
Legal Restrictions 
Some form of government interference is necessary to ensure 
fairness in political finance. First of all, parties must be required 
149 
150 
to disclose their financial activities. Experience in some American 
states has shown that laws can be successful (1) when they cover nomina-
tions and elections, all elective offices, all candidates and committees, 
and contributions as well as expenditures, (2) when reports are submitted 
before and after nominations as well as elections, and a financial agent 
is responsible for the entire committee, and (3) when reports are made 
on a standard form and deposited and inspected at a government agency 
which has·the obligation to demand completeness of the reports. In 
addition, parties should be required to submit annual financial accounts 
which give detailed and standardized infonnation and are certified by a 
public accountant. All material should be open to the public; but, 
except for a short swmnary statement, the government should leave publi-
cation to the private news media. 
Disclosure alone is not a sufficient restriction. The public 
may regard large contributions and expenditures as a sign of popu-
larity of the candidate or the party rather than an attempt at improper 
influence on the political process. Furthermore, the parties might 
not feel any desire to increase their appeal to smaller contributors 
or to improve wasteful propaganda methods. Some limitations, there-
fore, should be imposed. The complete prohibition of contributions 
from some sources, such as business and labor in the United States, 
has proven impossible to enforce. It omits the strong desire of these 
powerful financial sources to influence the political course which 
seems to be justifiable, at least at the present stage of political 
finance. Maximum limits of contributions which a person could make 
to a candidate, committee, or party per year or campaign should be set. 
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The amount must reflect present practices, desirability, and possibility 
of enforcemento No contributions should be pennitted within the last 
few days before election day and thereafter. Proper safeguards must 
ensure that no contrihutor can give more than the maximum amount to any 
one candidate, committee, or party. Tax benefits and similar legal 
incentives should be tried in order to channel business and labor money 
into all-partisan and non-partisan activities, such as sponsoring 
debates among candidates, campaigns for voting participation, and voter 
information. 
To avoid a conflict with the provisions on contributions, no 
maximum ceilings should be imposed on the total sum of money a candidate, 
committee, or party may receive or expend. Detailed limitations should 
be enacted, however, restricting certain methods of propaganda, such as 
broadcasting time, the number of posters, pamphlets and newspaper adver-
tisements. These restrictions can easily be controlled, but may be 
ineffective insofar as parties might divert the flow of their funds into 
other propaganda techniques. These other means of propaganda might prove, 
however, to be comparatively inefficient, if the most important methods 
are restricted and the parties might decide not to use them to a large 
extent. The list of limitations can also be adapted to the technical 
development from time to time. 
Host important is the fact that the provisions regarding disclos-
ure and limitations be strictly enforced. Basis for a successful 
enforcement of the law is its "enforceability." The provisions must be 
regarded as reasonable by the public and not overburden the enforcement 
personnel. The parties need ample room to develop new ideas; a narrow 
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regulation of their financial matters would be opposed to the political 
tasks of the parties. Limitations of contributions are observed under 
the new law in Florida, restriction of selected methods of propaganda 
works in France, and meaningful disclosure of party finance has been 
achieved in some American states. The central problem is to find a 
proper balance of the restrictive legal measures for the particular 
country; but there is no reason to believe that this is irnposoible. 
Public Subsidies 
Without any financial help from the government, the.financial 
situation of many political parties would be precarious, especially in 
those countries where the parties have received government funds already. 
Although financing the political parties from private sources seems to 
be the most adequate way and should remain the ultir.iate goal of reform, 
it would be unrealistic to deny the parties all government aid at p1·esent. 
Parties do not only compete among each other but also have to defend 
their ideas and position against powerful interest and pressure groups 
which try to influence the electorate. 
Some forms of goverronent assistance, such as granting public 
halls for campaign rallies, putting up billboards for posters, and pro-
viding broadcasting time, would be relatively inexpensive and easy to 
control. Public halls already exist; the parties could be charged a 
nominal fee as in Great Britain. The billboards could be rented for 
commercial advertising at other than campaign periods. Providing broad-
casting time would be more expensive but not amount to extraordinary sums 
because of the rather low saturation point of political programs. 
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Therefore, even in those countries where the government would have to 
buy the time from commercial stations, costs would be reasonable, 
especially when the government tried to get a discount for buying large 
quantities of time. Furthermore, this kind of government aid bas the 
advantage that it can be combined with restrictive measures, such as 
allowing the parties no or only a limited number of additional posters, 
broadcasts, etc. Other forms of selected public assistance, such as 
granting a franking privilege, distributing voter pamphlets, or paying 
for a newspaper advertisement, could also be taken into consideration 
and combined with restrictions. Questions, however, arise as to the 
selection of newspapers--choice of the party?--and to the effectiveness 
of the voter pamphlets whose success bas been different in the various 
American states. 
Easy control and limitation of selected public aid gives it an 
advantage over general financial assistance by the government in the 
form of monetary assistance. Tax plans preserve the initiative of 
parties and voters, because the amounts of money are determined by an 
annual decision of the taxpayer. The deduction plan, however, must be 
rejected because of the unequal treatment of the rich and the poor. The 
credit plan avoids 'this weakness but voters who do not owe a net tax 
(about one-third in Germany and the United States) cannot benefit from 
it. The same is true for the assignment plan which has the further 
disadvantage of not demanding any personal sacrifice from the taxpayer. 
The taxpayer only diverts money which he already owes to the government 
to a special fund. He need not add money from his own funds as under the 
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deduction and credit plans. The American Presidential Election Campaign 
Fund Act of 1966, furthermore, leaves the voter no choice as to the 
recipient of his dollar--the major parties get an equal share--and it 
omits proper means of control.* An additional .weakness of all tax plans 
is that the annual decision of the taxpayers might be regarded as a 
popular referendum though it would represent only a distorted picture of 
voter opinion. 
Subsidies from general government funds in the form of monetary 
payments are the least recommendable of all public aid. In favor of 
such subsidies it can be said that the parties need a steady flow of 
income for a continuous and meaningful planning and that the parties 
must become independent of the few wealthy and influential contributors. 
The same result, however, can be achieved by the less far-reaching aid 
for selected propaganda methods, by some restrictive legislation, and by 
increased party efforts in fund-raising. Arguments against direct 
government payments are more numerous and bear more weight. The techni-
cal problem of a fair distribution of the funds among the parties is 
difficult but not crucial, as adequate methods of distribution have been 
found for other government subsidies. A combination plan with emphasis 
on voter support and size as well as stability of party organization pro-
vides for a solution. Possible centralization and bureaucratization of 
the parties is another danger, which could be decreased, however, by giv-
ing the funds not only to the top of the party organization but to the 
*See note at p. 158 below. 
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different levels. Moreover, in many parties decisions are already made 
by the highest party officials so that government funds would hardly 
change the situation. In other parties, such as the dispersed American 
parties, a concentration of party forces is often regarded as welcome. 
It is also to be questioned whether enforcement of democratic practices 
within the parties can be achieved by financial regulations or is not 
rather the task of a general party reform. 
More serious are some other problems. How should candidates 
who run for nomination, especially in the American primary elections, be 
supported? A refund of expenses to a candidate who polled a certain 
percentage of the total vote seems to be most proper. But how can the 
amount of a justified refund be determined: actual expenditures, 
according to voter turnout or eligible voters, a fixed sum? Public 
assistance to selected methods of propaganda, such as posters, leaf-
lets, or broadcasts, seems to be preferable. The actual use of these 
means by the candidates can be better determined and controlled. As 
requirement for the participation in the public subsidies, a number of 
signatures of voters or party members could be prescribed. 
The decisive argument against direct payments out of government 
funds to political parties is that the actual need of funds cannot be 
estimated by an objective standard. Experience in Germany and Puerto 
Rico has ehown that the parties are inclined to raise the public sub-
sidies continuously and that there ·is no way of stopping the increase 
short of "full coverage" of party expenditures, whereby "full coverage" 
is a purely subjective term. Thie process is not so much the result of 
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succeeding voluntary decisions made by the politicians in the annual 
discussions upon the govemment and party budgets, but becomes a develop-
ment with a life of its own once it has been initiated. The reason is 
that the process is a part of a vicious circle independent of political 
control. The parties hold private funds insufficient and accept govem-
ment subsidies. This causes contributors to think that the parties do 
not need their help any longer and they decrease or stop their donations. 
On the other hand, the parties, instead of strengthening their efforts 
for private help, become discouraged and rely more and more on public 
funds. Finally, parties and voters lose interest in each other. This 
can happen especially when a method is used under which a fixed amount 
of money is distributed among the parties according to their strength in 
parliament, as in Germany and Puerto Rico. The danger is diminished 
when the total amount distributed is dependent on voter participation 
or size of party organization. Even under the system of a fixed total 
amount of government payments some parties may be interested in a high 
voter turnout, if the number of their adherents is disproportionately 
high among the non-voters. This fact, however, has become less signifi-
cant among the modern mass parties with their broad and inclusive 
appeals. The role of the party is to be a mediator between the citizen 
and his government. Direct monetary payments endanger this role, as 
the parties--independent of the voters' financial support--may disregard 
the voters' opinions and demands. Such a development would not only be 
contrary to the justification of political parties for democratic govern-
ment, but a threat to democracy in general. Present dependence on a few 
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wealthy contributors would be exchanged for a situation which is equally 
undesirable: isolation of parties from their followers. The potential 
danger is a sufficient reason to reject this form of public subsidies. 
Only under exceptional circumstances should such government aid 
be permitted. This was true for Germany when the Constitutional Court 
in its 1966 decision held direct government payments to political parties 
unconstitutional after it had declared in an earlier decision (although 
in a kind of obiter dictum) that these payments were possible. The pay-
ments should be limited to a certain period and distributed under proper 
safeguards. Given in the form of a matching incentive plan, they should 
have the purpose of helping the parties develop a broader financial base 
of private sources. In the beginning, the government portion could be 
larger than the amount of the private contributions with which the 
parties must match the govemment money. The government share should 
continuously decline, while the amount of the matching private contribu-
tions should proportionately be increased until the public payments could 
be discontinued. A maximum limit of the government money available for 
matching purposes could be set in the government budget and portions be 
assigned to the parties or their committees. A maximum limit could also 
be fixed for the size of each individual private contribution. Payments 
by the government should not be made to the parties directly but only to 
those who provide the parties with goods and services. 
In swmnary, it can be said (1) that parties should finance their 
activities from large numbers of small contributions, (2) that some limi-
tations should be imposed on private contributions, (S) that parties 
158 
should be restricted in certain methods of propaganda and be required to 
fully disclose their financial activities, and (4) that the government 
may take into consideration public assistance to certain selected 
methods of propaganda and, under exceptional circwnstances, direct mone-
tary payments for a limited period in the form of a matching incentive 
plan. 
R~form of party finance is necessary, but it must be realized 
that a radical change from private to public sources may only be a tem-
porary improvement ending up in an even greater crisis, while a well 
balanced combination of private initiative and public assistance presents 
a way to a more permanent solution. 
Attempts in the Senate to repeal the Presidential Election Cam-
paign Fund Act of 1966 ended in a compromise after several weeks of 
debate. Extraneous riders to a House passed tax bill (HR 6950) had been 
introduced, especially by Senators Gore of Tennessee and Williams of 
Delaware, in order to remove the 1966 Act. The main argument against the 
Act was the insufficiency of safeguards goveming the distribution of 
the campaign funds. Strong opposition to a repeal by Senator Long of 
Louisiana, howev~r, prevented final action until May 9, 1967, when the 
Senate rejected a motion for repeal of the Campaign Fund Act by Senators 
Gore and Williams but adopted a compromise suggested by Senator Mans-
field of Montana. The compromise leaves inoperative the money-collecting 
and money-disbursing features of the Act unless Congress decides on 
guidelines for handling the funds. According to Senator Long, it will 
be difficult, however, to·enact any legislation which would revive the 
subsidy plan. (For background of the Senate debates see Congressional 
uarterl, Weekly Report, vol. XXV [1967], no. 13 through no. 18 
Marc 81, p. 498; April 7, P• 507; April 14, P• 584; April 21, p. 628; 
April 28, pp. 657-660, Mays, p. 697]. For final vote on May 9, 1967, 
see Kansas City Times, May 10, 1967, pp. 1, 6.) -
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